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Understanding and Operating in Complex Networks: a Focus on the Role of the ‘Networker’

Discussion paper for ORL 5.1

APRIL 2006

Published by:
Catchment and Agriculture Services, Practice Change, Tatura, April 2006

ISBN 978-1-74199-187-1

Author:

Peter Howden

Acknowledgments:

This paper is part of a larger project Linking Policy and Practice funded by the Victorian Government’s Our Rural Landscape Initiative.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 SOME EMERGING CHALLENGES
1.2 THE LAYOUT OF THIS PAPER

2 WHY NETWORKS?

2.1 WHAT IS A NETWORK?
2.2 WHEN IS A ‘NETWORK’ APPROACH USEFUL?
2.3 SOME PROS AND CONS
- 2.3.1 The benefits of a network approach
- 2.3.2 The challenges of networks
2.4 WHY DO NETWORKS NEED ‘MANAGING’?

3 UNDERSTANDING NETWORKS

3.1 STRUCTURAL FACTORS AND SNA
3.2 COGNITION FACTORS
3.3 OTHER ‘SOCIAL’ FACTORS
- 3.3.1 Trust
- 3.3.2 Diversity
- 3.3.3 Conflict
3.4 INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER ‘STRUCTURAL’ FACTORS
- 3.4.1 On ANT, inertia and entrepreneurs
- 3.4.2 Tinkering with structure
3.5 NETWORKS AS CAPITAL
3.6 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
- 3.6.1 Historical influences
- 3.6.2 Political influence and support
- 3.6.3 Other contextual factors

4 THE NETWORK MANAGER – SKILLS, ROLES AND CHALLENGES

4.1 ‘LEADERSHIP’ ROLES
- 4.1.1 A note on transaction costs
4.2 ROLE CONFLICT AND SUPPORT
4.3 THE ‘SPECIAL’ ROLE OF THE PUBLIC ACTOR
4.4 PERSONALITY AND SKILL FACTORS
- 4.4.1 Cognitive accuracy
- 4.4.2 Personality and networks
- 4.4.3 Some empirical evidence
- 4.4.4 Networking as a competency

5 EVALUATING NETWORK ACTION

6 OPERATING IN NETWORKS – EMERGING AREAS OF INTERVENTION

6.1 STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
6.2 RAPID ASSESSMENT TOOL
6.3 NETWORK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
6.4 NETWORK SURVEY
6.5 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
6.6 NETWORK ‘TYPE’ AS STARTING POINT

7 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS – NETWORK MANAGEMENT AS REFLEXIVE ACTION

8 GLOSSARY

9 SOME FURTHER READING

10 REFERENCE LIST

List of Figures and Tables

FIGURE 1: PRI FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

TABLE 1: POTENTIAL SOURCES OF PUBLIC VALUE FROM COLLABORATION

TABLE 2: MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN NETWORKS

FIGURE 2: A MODEL OF THE ‘TOOLS’ AVAILABLE TO A NETWORK MANAGER

TABLE 3: QUESTIONS FOR COMMUNITIES BASED ON NETWORK ANALYSIS

FIGURE 3: HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE TO DEMONSTRATE VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF A NETWORK

1 Introduction

Horace [Slughorn]… likes the company of the famous, the successful and the powerful. He enjoys the feeling that he influences these people. He has never wanted to occupy the throne himself; he prefers the back seat … He used to handpick favourites at Hogwarts, sometimes for their ambition or their brains, sometimes for their charm or their talent, and he had an uncanny knack for choosing those who would go on to become outstanding in their various fields. Horace formed a club of his favourites with himself at the centre, making introductions, forging useful contacts between members, and always reaping some kind of benefit in return, whether a free box of his favourite crystalline pineapple or the chance to recommend the next junior member of the Goblin Liaison Office (Rowling 2005, p. 75).

As whimsical as it is, this passage about Harry Potter's Potions teacher at Hogwarts School for Witchcraft and Wizardry underscores the idea that operating effectively in social networks is a useful work (and life) skill. Some of the themes here – networks are a source of influence, resources and power; networks can be ‘managed’ for gain (not just crystalline pineapple); and, some people are more skilled at operating in networks than others – will be pursued in this review. More than this though, the ‘networks’ approach represents a better way of operating in the face of a number of important challenges in the governance of natural resources.

A fundamental theme underpinning the work in the Department of Primary Industry’s Our Rural Landscapes program 5.1 (ORL 5.1) is the emergence of a new form of governance that challenges the dominance of existing ways of doing the business of government (see Petris 2005). Driving this change are several emerging trends, including:

Smaller government and increased dispersal of power and responsibility for the ‘outcomes’ of government policy (eg. to private bodies), such that, often, the knowledge and resources required to influence change are held by multiple individuals and/or agencies;
A wealthier, more educated, more diverse, and more urbanised society, less concerned about primary production (except for where values clash, e.g. in peri-urban landscapes), and one demanding greater involvement in the decisions that affect their lives;
The increasingly ‘wicked’ types of problems or issues society seeks to address – that is, they are problems that are not ‘owned’ by a single agent; not easily defined; nor are they (easily) solvable, and tend to require joint action from government, industry, community and individuals (eg. non-point source pollution).

The language of public sector management has changed markedly observes Petris (2005). There is an increasing interest in achievement of longer term, integrated outcomes, a ‘rediscovery’ of community and the importance of tailoring government services to the needs of places, and a general shift in the language from competition and customer focus to that of partnership and citizen engagement. With this comes the recognition that current forms of governance are not adequate, or in fact, can hinder integration efforts by creating an environment where departments find themselves competing for budgets, policy, turf and political credit (Bardach, in Petris 2005).

Petris (2005) notes that policy-makers have attempted to respond to this growing complexity by more effectively engaging stakeholders in the policy process, but that, ‘simply adding consultation to the policy cycle misunderstands the fact that new ways of operating are required in more complex policy environments.’ Agranoff and McGuire (2001) claim that the only organisational form that is designed to work in such complexity is the ‘network’.

The concept of network governance has been introduced and explored in ORL 5.1 by Petris (2005), and a framework for operating in policy networks has been developed by Gooey (2005) and trialed and enhanced by Patterson-Majoor and Hulme (2006). This paper will draw on this work and the network literature to form the basis for a framework or guidelines that can be applied to the everyday ‘network’ challenges of program and project managers in DPI.

1.1 Some emerging challenges

The focus of most of the research on social networks has been on the consequences of networks (Borgatti & Foster 2003) – Why did this policy fail? How did this particular individual rise to power? Where were the loci of power driving strike action in a particular factory? Most is restricted to academic work that is inaccessible to practitioners due to its technical nature and the discipline-specific jargon (Cross et al. 2002). Some work in public policy has produced a framework for operating in complex networks (eg. Kickert et al. 1997b). Others have provided some ‘practical advice’ gathered from network managers. But these are either not (formally) published (e.g Colliver 2001a; Colliver 2001b), or are also largely inaccessible to the practitioner or those implementing policy in a regional setting (eg. Agranoff 2003).

What is absent, observes McGuire (2002), is a ‘vocabulary and imagery to tell meaningful stories of management in network settings.’

Where is the “day in the life of a public manager” fable to teach us the basic how-tos of network management? Where are the textbooks with full-colour pictorials, biographical accounts of highly skilled network managers? Where can we find documentation of a manager muddling through, groping along, or falling asleep at the wheel in network settings? (McGuire 2002, p. 599)

Additionally, there is a sense, that ‘networking’ is not seen as a legitimate role. We operate in networks all the time, and mostly intuitively, but it is rarely recognised as an important task in our work, unless it is a critical component of our substantive role (for example, DPI’s Community Regional Managers – CRMs). Even then, it could be argued that the true scope of network management is not appreciated.

Similarly, some see managing networks as something we have to do to get our jobs done, rather than as essential, strategic and ultimately beneficial. Many of those interviewed for this research, though, recognised the importance of their networks, and of using them more effectively in order to improve their business. Most, however, still considered that time spent cultivating their networks conflicted with the time they had for their substantive role – as a separate task rather than as integral.

The language of network management will be familiar and some of the processes outlined here will seem self-evident. Many will consider themselves already good at ‘networking’ and not see the value in deliberate attention to it. What is needed is a way to articulate what this network management job is; a language to describe it and define its components and tasks; and particularly, guidelines to help identify where a network management approach might provide better outcomes, or where it might lead to perverse outcomes. Potentially it could provide a more sophisticated way of framing the way we do the business of public management.

1.2 The layout of this paper

It is first necessary to overview a range of theories that illuminate the challenges and pitfalls of operating in networks, and some on the features of social complexity in general. It is an eclectic approach that will touch – albeit very briefly, and sometimes narrowly – on a range of literature, for example, on complexity theory, social capital, social psychology, organisational research, and of course, social network analysis.

The aim of this paper is to develop a ‘rich picture’ of the task confronting a network manager, to explore the enormous scope of the networking role, but also to provide general rules-of-thumb that might provide some clarity and confidence in the face of sometimes overwhelming complexity.

This paper will first provide an overview of the concept of networks and network management, describe where and why a network management approach might be useful, some of the pros and cons of operating in networks, and outline the rationale for why they need to be ‘managed’.

A range of ways of understanding networks will then be outlined: including Social Network Analysis (SNA) and the effect of structural features of networks on actors; the cognitive influence of cultural frames on the ways actors negotiate network relations; and the structuring influence of conventions and/or institutions on network action. It will also touch on issues of trust, diversity and conflict, as well as drawing parallels with the concept of social capital. Some contextual factors will also be considered, including historical and political barriers to effective collaboration.

Next, some of the skills required of the network manager will be explored, including leadership and personality factors, as well as some challenges of the manager position, including role conflict, and negotiating the peculiarities of the role of public actor. The challenges of evaluating collaborative action will also be briefly outlined.

Finally, some current thinking on how to manage complex networks will be introduced, along with some of the ‘tools’ of network management from the literature, and in development in Our Rural Landscape Program 5.1.

The paper concludes with a summary table of the range of issues a manager may have to deal with and the decision points in a network management process. This table will inform further work with DPI staff in network management positions that will be designed to describe further the ‘day in the life’ of a network manager and elaborate some strategies to make managing complex collaborative processes more deliberate and strategic.

Necessarily, such a complex area will require that several important issues are only given a brief overview. Throughout this paper, potential areas for further research will be identified in text boxes, thus

2 Why networks?

In this section I will briefly introduce the concept of networks and outline the rationale for this work. I will then suggest when a network approach might be useful, some of the positive attributes of a network management approach, and some of the challenges. I will finish with some of the reasoning behind why networks might need ‘managing’.

2.1 What is a network?

There is galaxy of terms and frameworks for describing the task of operating in networks across a range of literature and a wide range of research disciplines, creating a diverse, complicated and ‘often confusing picture’ (Berry et al. 2004). Some descriptions of networks are broad, ranging from boundaryless clusters of relationships (eg. Jackson & Stainsbury 2000), to specific, goal directed and interdependent (eg. Kickert et al. 1997c). Some include hierarchical and contractual relationships (eg. Goodwin et al. 2004). Others exclude hierarchies and note that the peculiar feature of networks is that they are horizontal and lack formal leadership. Goldsmith and Eggers (2004), for example, note the following types of networks in the context of public sector governance:

Service Contract: vertical and horizontal agreements with service providers
Supply Chain: formed to deliver a complex product to government (far fewer are found in the public sector than in the private sector because government mostly delivers services).
Ad-Hoc: a network activated in response to a specific situation – usually an emergency, for example, in response to natural disasters.
Channel Partnership: Companies and non-profits conduct transactions on behalf of government agencies in the same way that retail stores act as a distribution channel for manufacturers (retail stores handling fishing licences, for example).
Information Dissemination: partnerships with non-profit or for-profit organisations to disseminate public information to citizens.
Civic Switchboard: Where government connects diverse organisations in a manner where they augment each other’s capacity to produce an important public outcome – both because of its elected authority to represent all the citizens and because of its broad responsibilities.

This list seems to cover a broad range of government – non-government networks that exist in a formal sense, although, it does not include the informal information and advice networks that are critical to a public actor. Also, it could be argued that all imply some level of government ‘control’, and do not capture the true nature of interdependencies inherent in some of the more complex network problems government actors face. In short, the notion of networks is complex and contested and simple rules and guidelines only make sense in the context in which network management is being considered.

At its most basic, a (social) network is a set of actors connected by a set of ties; but this work requires that the concept of network is more specific to the tasks of a public manager. Networks here can be defined as: a public policy making and implementation (social) system involving multiple nodes (individuals, agencies and organisations) with multiple linkages – not just informal patterns of interaction, but also structures through which public goods and services are planned, designed and produced and delivered (modified from McGuire 2002). Given the complexity of the concept, a task in this paper will be to clearly outline where the process of network management is most relevant and where it is not. The list of network types above outlines the function of a range of network types, but not the underpinning features of the various network forms that will influence the approach a network manager might take.

2.2 When is a ‘network’ approach useful?

Given that the power, resources and knowledge to solve many of society’s complex problems lies with many individuals and organisations, and government is only one of the actors influential in the public policy process, government cannot always steer from a position above and detached from society (Kickert et al. 1997a). Hierarchical top-down steering does not work in systems without a top.

A great deal of the literature on network approaches focuses on their application to ‘wicked problems’. Network structures note Keast et al. (2004) represent ‘unique responses to very complex, messy, wicked problems that do not lend themselves to business as usual.’ Dealing with wicked problems is, to a large extent, a problem of interaction. A large part of dealing with them involves learning about the problem, the competing interests, the divergent beliefs about the relationship between (sets of) potential causes and possible solutions, and even different beliefs as to whether a ‘problem’ actually exists (global warming is a good example). The role of the public sector manager thus changes from defining the problems and finding a solution to facilitating others in identifying and deliberating about it (Alford, in Petris 2005).

Van Bueren et al. (2003) outline three forms of uncertainty that underpin wicked problems:

Cognitive uncertainty: Causal relations are numerous, interrelated and difficult to identify
Strategic uncertainty: Many actors involved. Diverging and conflicting strategies may cause stagnation and deadlocks in policy, but also may lead to surprising and unexpected outcomes.
Institutional uncertainty: decisions made in different places, in different arenas in which actors from various networks participate. Decisions are often only loosely coupled if at all.

The three themes, essentially cognition, actors in interaction and institutions recur in the network literature and represent the three areas commonly cited for effecting change in networks. These themes will be explored and elaborated in this paper.

Importantly government works in network areas that are not necessarily wicked, but still complex, requiring the coordination of a range of actors government cannot always compel to comply (eg. in the management of salinity). Unlike wicked problems, there tends to be an understanding of the origins of complex problems and (sometimes) general agreement that actors need to work together to solve them. However, the members of the network may have conflicting business, organisational or personal goals and different understandings of how the problem might be addressed. Network relationships inevitably require some compromises, and often members will need to agree to disagree on some issues in order sustain their working relationship.

The aim of network management then is to influence shared understanding and/or collective action between a range of disparate, but interdependent, actors to achieve outcomes in an arena in which there might be conflicting goals, understanding of causes and/or potential approaches to their solution. Four attributes of networks define the critical aspects that make a network approach useful (modified from Salamon, in Petris 2005):

Pluriformity: networks engage a diverse range of individuals and organisations, some of which have limited experience cooperating with each other and limited knowledge of each other’s operating styles.
Self-referentiality: actors have their own interests and frames of reference and therefore approach the relationship with different sets of perspectives and incentives.
Asymmetric interdependencies: all the actors in a network, including the state, are dependent on each other but rarely in a fully symmetrical way.
Dynamism: these features change over time, even as the network seeks to carry out its mission.

2.3 Some pros and cons

The networks approach can provide a number of advantages over other ways of operating (ie. the market, or hierarchical), but it is not a panacea for all the ills of a complex political environment. Below are some of the (interrelated) benefits and challenges of networks apparent in the literature.

2.3.1 The benefits of a network approach

Effectiveness: networks provide a forum for diverse and fragmented groups to cooperate across gaps in constituency, culture, tradition and geography (NAFFE 2004). By bringing together a range of actors with a stake in an issue, a range of knowledge (including local, political and scientific) can be brought to bear on a problem in a way that that may be more effective in reconciling multiple values. The network approach can also be more effective in applying for project grants, as the inclusion of multiple interests (eg. service providers and end-users) is increasingly sought by funding providers.

Efficiency: Frequently there is a shortage of resources available in the public sector, stakeholders have multiple needs, service providers work in narrow functional areas and agencies maintain services in narrow specified funding categories. Networks provide a way to pool resources, provide services in a way that improves collective ability to solve problems, while still maintaining acceptable levels of organisational and professional autonomy (Provan & Milward 2001).

Legitimacy: Insufficient democratic legitimacy can lead to conflict or outrage, and program and policy failure. The inclusion of the range of critical interest groups can lead to greater legitimacy and societal acceptance. Implementation and/or enforcement can then be easier and less costly (Kickert et al. 1997c).

Innovation and responsiveness: Schumpeter (in Ruef 2002) describes innovative action as the novel combination of existing ideas and routines. Innovation, therefore, requires that actors have access to information on disparate ideas and routines from which the elements can be combined (Ruef 2002). A greater diversity of interests in a network leads to a greater bank of knowledge and ideas, increasing the likelihood of innovative solutions to complex problems. Similarly, to be able to act effectively in a complex (or wicked) decision-making environment, government will need to be able to respond to a range of ‘threats’, many that cannot be predicted in advance. Ashby’s (1956) ‘law of requisite variety’, for example, says that in any system the available control variety must be equal to or greater than the disturbance variety for control to be possible. Jessop (2002) builds on this principle, which he argues is essentially ‘static’, and suggests that to minimise the risks of governance failure in a turbulent environment, government needs to cultivate a repertoire of responses to retain the ability to flexibly alter strategies and select those that are more successful. The notion of ‘control’ in a complex environment is an illusion.

Diffusion: As well as promoting innovation both in and across groups, networks are also important for the diffusion of innovations between the elements of the network. They allow individuals and organisations the chance to exchange knowledge and resources needed to increase their flexibility and collective ability to respond in a complex environment (Beacham et al. 2005). Similarly, networks allow for community knowledge of emerging issues to diffuse more effectively back to the relevant policy makers and service providers.

Building Collaborative Infrastructure: Ongoing links and relationships are important for building trust and norms of cooperation across networks. Through repeated interactions network members gain greater appreciation of the scope of their interdependence. They become engaged in a particular form of organisational learning called ‘collaborative know how’ (Simonin, in Imperial 2005). In essence, network actors learn how to collaborate by collaborating (Imperial 2005). This creates tradition of cooperation, even in an environment in which there are conflicting values and beliefs, that is available to be built on in subsequent interactions.

2.3.2 The challenges of networks

Size and Inclusiveness: A frequently mentioned limitation to network action is size. Usually there is a linear assumption; the more actors, the more difficult to reach an outcome. Generally this is true. Adding stakeholders to any problem-solving action increases transaction costs and the difficulty of achieving synergy. However, many question this simplification, noting that large numbers of potential participants do not pre-ordain failure (Ostrom 1990). An increase in conflict is also not certain; it can emerge even in the simplest of social systems (Conklin 2001). In reality, note Kickert and Koppenjan (1997), it is not always possible to exclude actors, ‘simply because of the interdependencies involved’. There is a considerable risk that critical actors may be excluded or removed that later may be essential to network success, or may challenge the outcomes of a network process in the media or in court. Conversely, small groups can be handicapped by limited access to the diverse resources (Poteete & Ostrom 2004), that can be critical for them to respond to a complex problem. It is not just a case of ‘the more the merrier’, but ‘a judgement about what is an adequate level of participation’ (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997, my emphasis).

Transaction Costs: Collaboration can be resource intensive. Time and effort may need to be expended to overcome ‘collaborative inertia’ (Imperial 2005) and build the social infrastructure (including trust and norms of interaction) of a network. Frequently public managers cannot afford the time to maintain relationships within their own organisation, let alone with a wider network. As noted above, social infrastructure built in previous network relationships can reduce the costs of establishing new relationships. However, this can also be a hindrance if the networks become insular and cannot adapt to new players or different contexts. Networks, therefore, require frequent attention. Assumptions that they will just ‘work’ – say in an emergency response – may be seriously misguided.

Time (to outcomes): Stakeholders, especially under urgent situations, can be impatient and want to get on with things so that they can get back to ‘their real job’ (Roberts 2000). Wicked problems in particular require a different way of thinking, with emphasis on learning together and exploring possibilities – things that take time. This is very frustrating, note Keast et al. (2004) to those who perceive this emphasis on process as being too focused on relationships at the expense of outcomes. Indeed one of their interviewees described it as “just having cups of tea” – not an uncommon perception.

Accountability: One important criticism of networks is the absence of conventional structures of accountability, because in networks there is no obvious principal steering agent.

With no single authority, everyone is somewhat in charge and, therefore, everyone is somewhat responsible. As a result, all network participants appear to be accountable, but none appear to be absolutely accountable (Agranoff & McGuire 2001)

To whom or what should network players feel responsible? Should one person or organisation be accountable? What if there is variance in the level of assumed responsibility across the network? Is there a network design that offers clearer accountability (but not control)?

As Provan and Milward (2001) point out, external stakeholder groups seldom exist for networks as they do for individual organisations. Community tends to evaluate, reward or punish individual agencies on what they do or do not do, rather than how well services are provided as a result of network activities. Situations can arise where one party (often the Government) is blamed for the outcome of a network process – ‘fictional responsibility’ de Bruin and Ringeling (1997) call it. The fact that government is supposed to protect the common interest, and be publicly accountable for its actions does not guarantee its rights in a network.

Power: Because the emphasis in networks is on cooperation and consensus, many feel that the issue of power is neglected or misjudged. While networks are basically horizontal structures without a ‘top’, power relationships can carry over from previous interactions, or develop over the course of network exchanges. For example, some network members interact more frequently, are more policy ‘literate’, and can share a ‘policy paradigm’. That is, they ‘understand the system from a particular perspective, which problems are most urgent, who are the main actors in the community and what main instruments might be or need to be used to tackle them’ (de Bruijn & Ringeling 1997). Other (eg. ‘grass-roots’) network members can be effectively excluded by existing structures and the dominant discourse. Well-organised, vocal, interest groups can also influence processes such that outcomes ultimately may lack democratic legitimacy.

Sub-optimality: Respondents in Imperial’s (2005) research claimed that network approaches often involved bargaining to the ‘lowest common denominator’ so that all actors’ interests were not threatened. This could result, he says, in sub-optimal policies that are unable to effectively address the problem. As O’Toole Jr. et al. (1997), note, it is often argued that an initiative with formal approval of all key players satisfies the priorities of no one.

Sustaining trust: Some suggest collaboration will not be an appropriate strategy for addressing controversial problems involving win-lose situations (Imperial 2005), or less effective where strident differences are present, for example between landowners and environmentalists in natural resource networks (Agranoff 2003). Network managers should avoid utilising network processes in situations in which there is a high risk of failure or the possibility that network outcomes will not be accepted by sponsoring agencies. Network based approaches can generate trust but also can result in conflict and distrust. Imperial and Hennessey’s (2000) research suggest that a negative experience can have a more profound effect on participants than a positive effect, damaging relationships that will be important for future collaboration.

In other words, a positive experience may not be a strong rationale for future collaborative activity but a negative experience was frequently used to justify not being engaged in an activity (Imperial & Hennessey 2000)

Networks, however, may be the only place where such wickedness can be addressed and where the true nature of differences can be safely explored (see, for example, DPI 2004).

Boundary definition: Wicked and complex problems by definition require the involvement of a much wider network of stakeholders, beyond the usual ‘policy elites’ (see Gooey & Howden 2004a). The implementation of policy can involve some specific objectives or problem solving activities defined and bounded in other phases of the policy process and therefore often requiring the participation of actors from different levels of government, as well as target groups and/or their representatives. Invariably there is some tension between the government and ‘grass-roots’ perspectives. Defining whom is in a network and who is out, and balancing this against transaction costs, time etc, can be a difficult job for a network manager.

Network managers should also not make the mistake, warn Kilduff and Tsai (2003), of believing that smaller informal, and/or loosely organised networks lack power to frustrate or facilitate activity. These networks, they note, have a latent structure that can be activated by conflict with bureaucracy in a way that can seem baffling to those blind to their relatively invisible functioning. Watts (2003), for example, observes that some studies of social movements suggest that events may have determined the leaders, rather than the other way around.

2.4 Why do networks need ‘managing’?

The issue then is ‘how to bring about enough cooperation among disparate community elements to get things done – and to do so in the absence of an overarching control structure or a unifying system of thought’ (Stone, in Agranoff 2003).

While there is often interest in cooperation and individuals and organisations may have a history of cooperation, networks do not ‘emerge spontaneously as self-sufficient automated entities’ (McGuire 2002) capable of working productively together. What is clear is that networks can be unstable, and the cooperation of key players is not always a given, even if cooperation seems logical. Networks can become immobilised or collapse because they adopt inappropriate procedures or structures – for example, they may not have effective methods of dealing with conflict and can spiral into a recurring cycle of dispute over ways of operating; or they may adopt a leadership structure more appropriate in a hierarchy, further empowering dominant groups. Networks can be dynamic, competitive (not always overtly) and unpredictable. Actors in a network will, over time, utilise different approaches and network relations to influence network direction in their favour.

Motivation to stay involved in a network can also decline if members feel that benefits and costs are not distributed appropriately. Not surprisingly, considerable research and practical experience has demonstrated that there can be significant difficulty in getting people with different expertise, backgrounds and problem-solving styles to effectively integrate their unique perspectives (Cross et al. 2002).

Incentive to participate is a frequently cited factor in the success of collaborations. A network will survive, note Goodwin et al. (2004) as long as all the parties involved in its development and operation feel ‘net worth’ from becoming a member. Networks have to be seen to produce results that are substantively ‘better’ than could be achieved if organisations had acted alone, or actors may not see the benefit of participation. Some suggest that cooperation aimed at achieving collective goals must be forced (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997), while others argue that much cooperative behaviour is routine and based on ‘standard operating procedures’ or informal rules or ‘conventions’ (March & Olsen in Kickert & Koppenjan 1997). Thurmaier and Wood (2002), for example, draw from empirical studies to highlight the importance of reciprocity. They found that organisations can develop a culture of cooperation that can override ‘economically rational’ reasons for not collaborating.

Networks can also produce outcomes that satisfy the network participants, but which conflict with the overall goals of government or impact unfairly on other sections of the community.

Actors working together on a problem can find themselves in a type of groupthink situation, with the interests of the outside world insufficiently considered or not considered at all.

Win-win situations may have been achieved precisely because certain actors were excluded from the decision making or because costs were placed elsewhere (Klijn & Koppenjan 2000).

While actors may come to the network table with conflicting opinions as to goals and strategies, interests are not fixed, they are social constructs which can change through interaction with other actors in the network (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997). Network management therefore occurs in a tension between interdependency and a changing diversity of goals and interests. The outcomes of a network approach are the uncertain result of negotiation between these interests and strategies and importantly, cannot be determined beforehand. One person colourfully described network management as ‘herding cats’ (Agranoff 2003).

Finally, the very notion of ‘managing’ needs to be challenged. Government is not by default always the manager of complex networks, the public, for example, can fill this role. There may be multiple leaders at any given time. As will be discussed later (see section 4.3), government is often in a ‘better’ position to manage networks. Even then, it is better to consider network management ‘in terms of crafting with its connotations of motivating people and shaping preferences’, rather than as ‘designing according to defined procedures and fixed templates’ (Beacham et al. 2005). You cannot force networks to work, you can only help create the conditions for effective interaction. ‘Managing’ can, therefore, variously involve, ‘facilitating’, ‘mentoring’, ‘persuading’, ‘cajoling’, and even ‘upsetting’, rather than exerting direct authority.

3 Understanding networks

What are the basic features of networks? What is it useful for us to know about networks in order to be able to better manage them more effectively? In this section I will consider a number of ways of understanding networks, that come from a range of theoretical perspectives and outline some of the key issues that a network manager might have to deal with.

3.1 Structural factors and SNA

Much research into networks in the sociological tradition is dominated by social network analysis (SNA). SNA utilises software to analyse data and produce matrices, graphs and sociograms of multiplex relations and links between actors using statistical and algorithmic tools. For example, SNA may seek to explain the strengths and weaknesses in network links, whether subgroups are isolated or overlap, or where there are dominant individuals or cliques, or individuals (brokers) that link to critical resources.

SNA’s appeal, note Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994), comes from its ‘claim’ to explain social behaviour by addressing how actors are enabled or constrained by how they are connected in the network. For example, the chances of winning the Eurovision song contest, notes Burt (2000), are influenced by a country’s position in relation to other countries. Importantly, this theory proceeds from a rejection of all attempts to explain human behaviour or social processes solely in terms of ‘the categorical attributes of actors (eg. class, age, gender, ethnicity, psychological disposition etc.), whether individual or collective’ (Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994).

Relational approaches to networks have been discussed at some length in other documents informing this work (Gooey & Howden 2004a; Gooey & Howden 2004b). What follows is a quick summary of a couple of the many SNA concepts that might inform a network management strategy.

Density of ties

Density is simply a measure of how many connections there are between actors compared to the maximum possible number of connections.

Kilduff and Tsai (2003) note that network density can have some counter-intuitive effects on outcomes. They reported, for example, of a study of health networks in which the city with the lowest network connectivity between agencies had the highest effectiveness, and conversely, the city with the highest connectivity had the lowest. At the root of this is the recognition that dense ties can stifle change and innovation. Networks can become highly parochial and exclude marginal world-views – often the source of fresh ideas (Gooey & Howden 2004a). This can lead to ‘network inertia’ (Becker 1995; Hansen 1999) where familiar routines and relationships are repeated over and again despite changes in the operating environment.

Closure and brokerage

To what degree is an individual a critical link to important resources? Work in this area emphasises the value of identification of ‘gaps’ in the social world (structural holes) that can be connected by enterprising individuals to ‘broker’ (Burt 2005) the flow of information between them. The value in the connection is the different resources (eg. knowledge) that circulate in the different groups. Much of Burt’s work emphasises the advantage this brings to (corporate) individuals in terms of faster promotion, higher pay, greater recognition etc (eg. Burt et al. 1998; Burt 2001b; Burt 2005). However, bridging such structural holes can also put a public manager in a position to better understand diverse interests on an issue, and to strategically bring appropriate individuals together to address a complex policy problem.

Conversely, stability in networks (closure) encourages the formation of trusting relationships. Levin and Cross (2004) note evidence that suggests strong ties lead to greater knowledge exchange, particularly where that knowledge is complex or tacit, perhaps because the strong ties are likely to expend effort to ensure the knowledge seeker understands and can put to use the information.

This suggests a paradox. At various stages in the lifetime of a network, it may be more valuable to be loosely connected, at other times it is better that relationships are closer and more trusting. Hansen (1999), suggests that weak ties are more valuable in the initial ‘search’ phase of an innovative process, whereas strong ties more important in the ‘transfer’ phase where knowledge must be incorporated into the project. For example, Granovetter (1973, borrowing from Rogers) notes that ‘first adopters’ (or innovators) are at the extremes of networks, while ‘early adopters’ are a more integrated part of the system. Thus we see the value of weak ties for the dissemination of information, as well as the value of strong ties for ‘normalising’ that information in the wider network (Granovetter 1973).

Brokerage is about coordinating people between whom it would be valuable, but risky, to trust. Closure is about making it safe to trust (Burt 2005)

This, however, presupposes that we can simply divide programs and processes into neat phases. An innovation process is rarely linear (Conklin 2001) and policy or program development is often iterative. There is no simple solution, but at the very least there is a need to consider if the structure of the network is serving its needs at any given time.

Centrality

Is a network centralised around one or a few actors? Are those actors also clustered or distributed in multiple centres or cliques? What effect does this have on network function? Kilduff and Tsai (2003, citing Schrader et al.) note that highly centralised informal networks may tend to be more mechanistic in their functioning, whereas organisations with multiple centres may be more organic.

At an individual level, centrality can also be a measure of how influential an actor is in a network. That is, many people may identify a particular individual as an opinion leader or as an important source of information. These individuals may hold a level of power (sometimes not overt) that can influence the direction of the network.

3.2 Cognition factors

Underpinning much network analysis, assert Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994), is the assumption that social networks can best be conceptualised as linking together ‘concrete’ entities such as persons and organisations, rather than as also embodying such things as ideas, motivation and discourse, as well as ‘cognitive maps’.

Network analysis all too often denies in practice the crucial notion that social structure, culture, and human agency presuppose one another; it either neglects or inadequately conceptualises the crucial dimension of subjective meaning and motivation—including the normative commitments of actors—and thereby fails to show exactly how it is that intentional, creative human action serves in part to constitute those very social networks that so powerfully constrain actors in turn (Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994, original emphasis).

Recent research in cognitive psychology provides a perspective on the influence of cognitive and cultural factors.

3.2.1 Culture and cognition influences on networks

DiMaggio (1997) asserts that individuals process the information they perceive every day through cultural ‘schemata’ (a sort of cognitive ‘toolkit’ of strategies and techniques) in a process that is ‘implicit, unverbalised, rapid, and automated’. This every-day, routine cognition shapes and biases thought, influences how people attribute accuracy or plausibility to information, and provides ‘default assumptions’ about the characteristics of, and the relationship between, objects and events (DiMaggio 1997). This should not be seen in a negative light, note Schaap and van Twist (1997), but as critical for individuals to make any sense at all of ‘reality’ in all its complexity.

Frames enable actors by reducing complexity and ‘ordering their understanding of the social world and of themselves, by constructing their identities, goals, and aspirations, and by rendering certain issues significant and others not’. Cultural structures also constrain actors by blocking out certain possibilities for action, or by preventing certain arguments from being articulated, or favourably interpreted (or even understood), in public discourse (Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994). Actors can be cognitively closed to those aspects of ‘reality’ to which they don’t ascribe and meaning, or to which they ascribe a different meaning (Schaap & van Twist 1997).

Cognitive (cultural) factors are context dependent. Actors’ frames are developed in interaction processes with others. An important part of this is ‘discourse’. Network specific discourse rules can determine what words are appropriate or not. Specific language forms can arise (network dialects) that actors must obey in order to be heard (Schaap & van Twist 1997). At their worst, closed networks built from strong ties create ‘echo’ (Burt 2001a). Dispositions and interpersonal evaluations are reinforced and amplified into positive and negative extremes. These processes ‘divide reality into such antithetical categories as “pure” and “polluted,” “just” and “unjust,” and “sacred” and “profane”’ (Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994). This is evident in the tendency of groups to adopt public positions more extreme than the preferences of their members, especially when acting with reference to a contrasting group (DiMaggio 1997).

Culture also exists as ‘symbols’ external to an individual and network. Many classifications lie ‘ready made’ in the language we have learned to speak. They order our world, for example, differentiating between farmers and greenies, the employed and the unemployed, sociologists and economists. Thus dividing also means ‘differentiating, sorting, classifying, individualising, discriminating, labelling, stigmatising’ (Schaap & van Twist 1997).

The cultural frames of individuals and groups can contribute to the ‘closedness’ of networks. Social closedness occurs when certain actors are excluded from the interaction, for example because other actors fail to appreciate their contribution or consider it irrelevant. Frequently this exclusion is manifest in informal rules of behaviour, which develop within a network and regulate the inclusion of actors in and their exclusion from, the network.

Two forms of cognitive closedness are outlined by Schaap and van Twist (1997): closedness in the sense of an inability to perceive and closedness in the sense of an unwillingness to perceive.

Unconscious cognitive closedness: Actors who are not aware of the different world-views in the ‘real world’ around them cannot ascribe meaning to them (in reference to their own frames), and therefore don’t incorporate them in their deliberations. Unconscious cognitive closedness requires deliberate efforts at understanding the frames of other important actors in the system. This goes beyond simple facilitated getting-to-know-you processes.

Conscious cognitive closedness: Actors can declare a particular line or approach as out of order. This can be a deliberate strategy to reduce complexity – ‘you can’t discuss everything’ or ‘that’s not relevant’. Actors, or groups of actors, can also deploy veto power to exclude other actors or other points of view, thus limiting the frame of the network. The two types of closeness can thus reinforce each other (Schaap & van Twist 1997).

3.2.1.1 Managing closedness

In contrast to the schematic (‘implicit, unverbalised, rapid, and automated’) thought outlined above, DiMaggio (1997) notes another rarer and quite different form of cognition, which is ‘explicit, verbalized, slow, and deliberate.’ When sufficiently motivated, he notes, people can ‘override programmed modes of thought to think critically and reflexively.’

There are three facilitating conditions that promote this form of thought (DiMaggio 1997).

Attention: People shift into deliberative modes of thought relatively easily when their attention is attracted to a problem.

Motivation: People may also shift from automatic to deliberative cognition when they are strongly motivated to do so by dissatisfaction with the status quo or by the moral salience of a particular issue.

Schema failure: Finally, people shift to more deliberative modes of processing when existing schemata fail to account adequately for new stimuli. While a group can initially frame others on the basis of stereotypes, they shift to more deliberate evaluations when faced with very strong inconsistent evidence (Schneider, and Berger, in DiMaggio 1997).

Network management techniques are often created around stimulating this more deliberate from of thinking or by removing cultural barriers to it. Typical strategies include ‘activation’ of new actors with different world-views, ‘deactivation’ of actors who may be blocking reflection, or stimulating ‘reframing’ so that actors are exposed to a different way of thinking. The skill, Klijn and Teisman (1997) suggest, is to find a ‘clever and economical’ balance between control and chaos.

Schaap and van Twist (1997), though, warn that ‘fashionable’ network management strategies are formulated far too easily and fail to combat the cause of the closedness, addressing instead its manifestation. Introducing new people or ideas, conflict resolution mechanisms, or stimulating reflection cannot be effective if actors consciously declare other frames to be out of order and refuse to recognise other situations, or if the veto power of actors in the network is not broken through.

3.3 Other ‘social’ factors

A number of other ‘social’ factors related to the interactions between network members are important. Three are briefly considered below: trust, diversity and conflict.

3.3.1 Trust

conceptualisations of trust. The concept of trust is complex and context is important. Some issues noted in the literature include:It is perhaps not surprising that most work on networks speak to the importance of trust. Mayer (1995, citing Gambetta), however, suggests that scholars tend to mention trust in passing, allude to it as a fundamental ingredient or lubricant and an unavoidable dimension of social interaction, ‘only to move on to deal with other less intractable matters. ’The literature on trust is large and it is not intended that I go deep into it here, suffice to warn against simple

Trust is domain specific and related to such things as the level of risk in an interaction.
Trust operates at different levels. It is unlikely that trust in individuals and trust in organisations are the same (Hardin, in Fattore et al. 2003).
Exploiting trust can be advantageous to some (Klijn & Koppenjan 2000). Burt (2005) notes, for example, that almost half of fraud cases are committed by someone known to the victim.
Heterogeneity is advantageous for innovation, but also makes establishing interpersonal trust more difficult.
Pre-existing trust-based relations between organisations may make establishing a network easier, but conversely it can be an obstacle to new network entries.
Frequent turnover in some organisations, means that relationships between agency staff may not be able to be based (only) on trust, but rely heavily on informal and formal rules of behaviour and interaction.
You can cooperate with someone you don’t really trust (Mayer et al. 1995).

Interpersonal trust takes time, and builds over a period of years. Some roles in a network, such as that of a broker require trust within a much shorter time frame: ‘months, weeks, even minutes’ (Burt 2005). A person new to a network may also have to establish as ‘trusting’ relationship very quickly.

The concept of perceived ‘trustworthiness’ may be useful here. Mayer et al. (1995) note three related and interdependent factors that underpin trustworthiness:

Ability: the perceived experience or competence of the trustee (this is obviously context dependant);
Benevolence: the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor; and,
Integrity: the trustor's perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable.

Research Gap: What are the precursors and antecedents of trust? What does acting in a trustworthy manner involve? What does it allow you to do? How do you maintain it?

Organisational trust is also important in the context of public policy networks. Research by Fattore et al. (2003), for example, suggests a link between general levels of trust in society and trust in institutions. To be effective (particularly when relying on some level of cooperation), it is important that governments operate in ways that foster the development of trust and confidence in public institutions (Petris 2005).

Trust is undoubtedly important in networks, but by itself may be insufficient. It may need to be backed by formal and informal rules and norms of behaviour.

3.3.2 Diversity

As noted above, greater diversity can lead to a greater bank of opinions, ideas and values therefore increasing the likelihood of innovation, and importantly, a more democratic outcome (Kickert et al. 1997c). Thus, as with the issue of numbers of network participants, it is not a simple matter of calculating the transaction costs associated with adding extra members to the network. The right question is whether the appropriate people are in the network and whether all the important resources and perspectives are available to bring to bear on the problem.

The importance and difficulty of gaining ‘consensus’ is sometimes over-emphasised. Network management, note Termeer and Koppenjan (1997), is not really about reaching consensus, particularly given the mixed motive nature of interaction processes in networks. Attempts to ensure that all actors have the same perceptions, they note, are unnecessary, undesirable, likely to suppress legitimate aspirations, and doomed to failure. Managing perceptions in networks is ‘not aimed at the creation of an overall consensus, but at the minimum of agreement which allows for joint action’ (Termeer & Koppenjan 1997).

3.3.3 Conflict

Conflict is often seen as something that should be ‘managed’ or avoided through various processes, including the separation of antagonistic individuals or groups, or even the exclusion of ‘trouble-makers’ from a network. Conflict (or controversy), however, can actually be beneficial to a network, as long as it is not protracted.

Some, for example, advocate ‘management by chaos’ as a legitimate strategy (Kickert et al. 1997c; Kickert & Koppenjan 1997). Conflict can be deliberately encouraged, or confrontations between individuals arranged, to break a persistent deadlock, the dominance of one world-view, or to stimulate innovative thinking.

A less extreme approach is Flora and Flora’s (1993) notion of ‘constructive controversy’. Controversy, they suggest, is ‘the opposite of conflict, not the opposite of absence of disagreement.’ They warn that the absence of controversy is as dangerous as is the presence of conflict. Constructive controversy (or symbolic diversity) (Flora & Flora 1993) includes drawing boundaries loosely, focussing on processes and the depersonalisation of politics, and encouraging the acceptance of controversy such that network members feel they can oppose another’s point of view without risking social relationships or the respect of the other.

Of course, networks with deeply rooted divisions may not respond to efforts to encourage ‘symbolic diversity’, however, conflict should not be simply treated as a threat, but considered also as an opportunity.

3.4 Institutions and other ‘structural’ factors

As actors interact with each other over a period of time and develop an understanding of each other’s goals and world-views, they create formal and informal rules that guide and structure their interaction. Lockie (2006) suggests that ‘convention theory’ may usefully be drawn on to focus attention on the role of habits, customs and routines in facilitating ‘mutually comprehensible actions and accountability’ among network participants (see also Biggart & Beamish 2003). Others focus on ‘institutions’ also as durable relations, rules, shared convictions, norms and values, and language (van Bueren et al. 2003) that structure the relationship between actors. Biggart and Beamish (2003) suggest that conventions are institutions ‘writ small’, or that institutions are ‘bundles of conventions’ that have been reified as normal.

At an organisational level, ‘institutional logics’ (Friedland & Alford, in DiMaggio 1997), such as those formalised in a strategic plan (as interpreted in the heads of various managers), also strongly influence decision-making and help agency personnel to align and orient their activities in meaningful ways. In essence these formal and informal rules have an important organising role, like the grammatical rules that make human verbal communication possible (Klijn & Teisman 1997). However, while they may have an essential guiding effect in organisations, there may emerge a conflict between the ‘norms’ in a collaborative network and those of the organisation a member belongs to.

3.4.1 On ANT, inertia and entrepreneurs

Actor Network Theory (ANT) is another way of considering complex social systems. ANT effectively dissolves the boundaries between structure and agency by conceptualising the social as relationships between entities (rather than individuals or totalities), including people, non-human organisms, technologies and texts in a way that is ‘simultaneously real, discursive and social’ (Latour, in Lockie 2006). For example, disputes over food safety, energy policy and waste management, notes Lockie (2006, citing Latour), ‘illustrate the manner in which contemporary issues mix together “chemical reactions and political reactions”, the “right to development” and its ecological consequences, in seamless narratives of politics, biology, history, technology and ethics.’

Thus social relationships can be usefully represented as ‘bundles’ (Biggart & Beamish 2003) or ‘packages’ (of technologies, objects, people and routines etc), each piece presupposing the existence of all the others, in totality exerting a stabilising inertial force (Becker 1995; Biggart & Beamish 2003). The more you want to deviate from the standard package, the more you find that everything else is connected with it (Becker 1995). This creates ‘competency traps’ for organisations in which outmoded and persistent world-views and practices block the development of new ideas and products. Individuals need ‘new knowledge, a psychological [entrepreneurial] ability to get outside customary ways of thinking, and the ability to withstand the sanctions imposed by upholders of the convention’(Biggart & Beamish 2003).

And all that shows how organizations stay stable—by raising the price of innovation—and how they change—through the activity of people for whom that price is, for whatever reason, not prohibitive (Becker 1995).

3.4.2 Tinkering with structure

Many emphasise the importance of normalising informal agreements and shared social norms by establishing formal rules. This helps ensure that policies are implemented and that core operational level activities are effectively undertaken. It also makes future collaborative efforts less dependent on personal relationships or leaders that are hard to replace (Imperial 2005), and stabilises situations where staff turnover is high. Formalisation of rules also makes enforcement more ‘legitimate’ or enhances the avenues for peer pressure on recalcitrant network members.

Some authors stress the importance of institutional design in determining the nature of collective action (Rydin & Pennington 2000, and see Ostrom 2000). Indeed this is probably desirable in the design of a new program. By institutional design is meant a package of measures which will shape the ways in which actors within a network will interact over the medium to long term, such as:

The role of actors within interactions;
The assignment of rights and duties to actors;
The rules of interaction, including monitoring and enforcement;
The norms and routine practice of interaction;
The language of interaction;
The handling of conflicting values;
The building of agreement, compromises and trade-offs;
The presentation and self-presentation of actors and the interaction process. (Rydin & Pennington 2000)

However, tinkering with institutions in existing networks can be fraught. Ostrom (in Kickert et al. 1997c) notes that forms of self-regulation in networks may be based (amongst other things) on local knowledge and shared rules and perceptions. Attempts to alter institutional arrangements can damage or destroy the relationships already existing. Instrumental reforms may best be incremental and build on existing relationships, rather than seeking to replace them. This is not to deny that radical institutional redesign is not a useful strategy – particularly where the current arrangements are dysfunctional, or are not appropriate for addressing network objectives – only that managers should carefully consider the potential implications of significant changes to the network structure.

3.5 Networks as capital

In previous work for ORL 5.1, we reviewed the relevance of social and human capital in public policy (Gooey & Howden 2004b). We adopted a social structural definition that explicitly links networks to the concept of social capital.

Social capital refers to the networks of social relations that provide access to needed resources and supports (PRI, 2003b)

The social capital field is hotly contested, and two streams are still apparent in this structural view. A configurational view (eg. Coleman 1988; Burt 2005) that focuses on the benefits (and drawbacks) of various ‘patterns’ of interaction between people, and a connectionist stream (eg. Lin 2001) that focuses on the resources that are available through those ties – the ‘pipes’ or the ‘flows’ to put it another way (Borgatti & Foster 2003). While glossing over this debate for the sake of the focus of this paper, this does focus our attention on the quality and composition of network connections, the potential resources they connect to, and the influence on such things as access to information, support, performance and well being.

The Canadian Policy Research Initiative (PRI) developed the following model (figure 1) to illustrate their framework for building social capital as a public policy tool (PRI 2005).

Figure 1: PRI framework for the analysis of social capital

While their model takes a ‘configurational’ approach (pipes) to social capital, their model does consider the range of inputs (determinants, context and required resources) critical to the function of a network, including other forms of capital.

Note that ‘trust’ appears (rightfully) as a determinant, an outcome, and an aspect of social capital (the grey box), reinforcing the argument here that the notion of trust is complex and placing into question simple conceptualisations that portray trust almost as a synonym for social capital.

Importantly, this also emphasises the idea that social (and human) capital building in networks is a significant goal in itself (see Evaluation of Networks, section 5).

Some network approaches are short-term and aimed at solving an immediate problem. A social capital approach recognises that network systems can interact frequently and that building that system for future interactions (or even as an end in itself) can be advantageous. For example, in emergency response networks it is not enough to assume that the network will perform effectively upon activation. Efforts to ensure the network is responsive and capable require that continual (if infrequent) attention is given to such things as the quality (social capital) of the network and the skills and knowledge (human capital) of individuals.

3.6 Contextual factors

Networks often compete with, and are fragmented by, aspects of the organisational environment such as formal structures, work processes, geographic dispersion, human resource practices, leadership styles, and culture (Cross et al. 2002). Some of the critical factors that influence the success of networks are outlined below.

3.6.1 Historical influences

Past relationship can create a discordant environment in which to develop new network relationships. The highly adversarial nature of traditional environmental policy note Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (in Schneider et al. 2003) has created a legacy of conflicting coalitions, where tight-knit networks and shared belief systems within each network inhibit cooperation between them. Lewis (2005) in her research, for example, found that the establishment of Primary Care Partnerships had been adversely effected by an atmosphere of competition in their locality, reflecting the policy emphasis on purchaser-provider separation, compulsory competitive tendering as well as local government amalgamations.

3.6.2 Political influence and support

Government departments, their competing statutory objectives, diverse values or missions, budgetary responsibilities, resource constraints, turf, etc. can provide a significant hindrance to collective action and frustrate network managers (Imperial 2005). Network participants may have to convince their respective line managers, program managers and/or funders that collaboration is an appropriate (if not more effective) strategy in the face of competing claims for a share of scarce organisational resources. They may also have to convince their superiors to ‘trust in the process’. This and the possibility that a collective approach will require some compromise in departmental aspirations will suggest high-risk to an organisation used to the closely scrutinised outcomes focus of the new public management model.

The processes followed by a network manager and any compromises made in a network setting may even be seen by the organisational hierarchy as utilising unacceptable methods and as pursuing a contrary agenda (O'Toole Jr et al. 1997). Garnering organisational support then becomes one of the most critical tasks of a network manager in an implementation network. While the horizontal relationships are frequently cited as a defining feature of a policy network, policy implementation has an equally important, if not more important ‘vertical’ aspect. These not only involve multiple parties, often located at different levels of government, but also, likely, target groups or their representatives.

3.6.3 Other contextual factors

Of course, the range of contextual factors that might influence a network is much broader than can be simply outlined here. The PRI model above (figure 1) for example, considers the broader (cultural, political, legal, institutional, economic, social and environmental conditions) as well as contextual factors specific to an action (eg. is the local political environment turbulent or stable).

Context is a particularly important part of the Outcomes Framework developed in ORL 5.1 (Johnson et al. 2005) and future work will go into linking network management strategies to this framework.

4 The network manager – skills, roles and challenges

Managing a network then involves a constant tension between the autonomy of actors and accountability to the network, between creating a stable collaborative structure that encourages members to share their resources, while at the same time not constructing a closed network resistant to new members or ideas, or unable to adapt to new challenges.

Accountability mechanisms (eg. formal rules or informal ‘peer pressure’ mechanisms) can help reduce strategic behaviour (e.g. free riding, shirking or turf guarding). However, excessive monitoring or enforcement can be a disincentive for potential collaborators, who may fear reprisals or criticism (Imperial & Hennessey 2000). Similarly, frequent facilitation processes designed to help people ‘get to know each other’ can frustrate and irritate those who want to ‘get on with the job’.

Along the way, network managers need to avoid other pitfalls, such as capture by particular special interests, procedural overkill such that processes becomes excessively complicated, or possibilities so restricted by compromise that the outcomes of network negotiations are perverse or too watered down to create significant change.

Jackson and Stainsbury (2000) outline a number of skills that network managers will need to deal with the ‘evolutionary nature of network relationships’: diplomacy, to foresee potential conflicts when they arise in the shifting patterns of relationships; a high tolerance for uncertainty to deal with the ambiguous nature of the relationships between elements of the network; and, an ability to stand back to find patterns and meanings in what will often be a chaotic set of relationships.

Klijn and Teisman (1997) (amongst others) also remind that one should probably consider network management as an activity that can be performed by any of the actors taking part, and sharing the load, rather than as something which is exclusively carried out by one actor. So the role of network manager may also involve the cultivation and support of other leaders, as well as the consideration of ‘succession’ if the network is to persist as members come and go.

4.1 ‘Leadership’ roles

Many, like Bardach (1998), emphasise the importance of ‘effective’ leadership in networks. This, on the surface, seems to conflict with the idea of networks as having flat structures that have no top. However, even in networks were authority is more dispersed, there are important roles in orchestrating a vision, following through on actions, contacting and coordinating key players (Agranoff 2003), selling the process within an organisation and getting it to keep to the agreed procedures (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997). Networks rarely just happen, they must be developed and maintained, particularly if they are going to achieve important outcomes in a timeframe that is acceptable to government.

The literature on leadership styles is extensive. Some important roles gleaned from the network literature are summarised below:

‘Catalytic’ leader: Networks need one or a small number of champions to manage the functional aspects internal to the network, from the process of developing the vision, to ensuring the network has clerical and communication resources. They must ‘have a passion for it’ (Agranoff 2003). This leader can be, but is not necessarily, the chair of the network. Agranoff (2003) notes cases where this role was rotated with the chair, but that this was problematic if the chair was inactive, given the importance of this position for network continuity. Sub-committees also require their own catalytic leaders.

‘Vision keepers’ or promoters: As important as the catalytic leader, notes Agranoff (2003), is a group of people, usually representing a range of different agencies, who work at the interface between the network and their agencies, promoting access to information and resources and organising events aimed at information sharing. Presumably these people also have a critical role in promoting the networks activities within their own agency.

The ‘boundary spanner’ or ‘broker’: These people hold an ‘authorised’ role in managing inter-organisational relations. Creating of inter-personal relationships, working contacts to gain information, understanding values, undertaking negotiations and generating trust are amongst their critical skills (Goodwin et al. 2004). Brokers, by definition, cannot be full members of the group and need to maintain a certain ‘neutrality’, while at the same time being respected in the group. They need ‘enough distance to bring a different perspective, but also enough legitimacy to be listened to’ (Wenger, in Colliver 2001a).

Importantly, the network managers need to ensure that the brokers are not acting in their own interest and as a network ‘bottleneck’ rather than as a valuable source of information and influence.

Thus the notion of a single leader is not always helpful. Instead a range of leadership roles may be needed through the lifetime of a network, and should be nurtured. As previously noted, the broader responsibilities of government (i.e. public good outcomes) and potential access to a broader range of resources might make the public actor a more logical ‘manager’ (catalytic leader), but this is often far from clear cut.

Of particular importance state Kickert and Koppenjan (1997) is the extent to which other actors consider the network manager legitimate. The qualities and skills of the network manager are an important precondition for success and not every organisation will be capable of filling this role. Agencies seeking to manage networks do not automatically have the legitimacy to exercise leverage over networks, or the skills to do so (Goodwin et al. 2004).

The trick seems to be in knowing when to lead, when you can lead, and which style of leadership is suitable in what network situation. There are no easy answers but to cultivate the adaptable and diplomatic skills suggested by Jackson and Stainsbury (2000, above)

4.1.1 A note on transaction costs

The transaction costs of running a network – including recruiting, administration, communication, facilitation, and just ‘keeping in touch’ – represent a significant challenge to running a network. They increase with the size of the network and the complexity of the task. Several ways of dealing with this issue have been suggested, including:

Drawing on ‘goodwill’ in the network and utilising volunteers;
Spreading the load amongst the agencies (difficult when network members have vastly different sized budgets and/or resources at their disposal);
Rotating administrative duties with the chair. Useful if the chair is from a key agency with lots of resources;
Allocating the ‘manager’ role to a member from a agency that may be able to provide appropriate support; and/or,
Encourage investments in relation-specific assets (eg. databases, inventories, plans, or other resources) that are shared and support collaborative efforts (Imperial 2005).

Some have sought to develop a separate coordinating committee (see NAFFE 2004). In the NAFFE example the committee’s responsibilities are largely administrative, including drafting a budget, planning annual events, hiring and supervising staff and conferring with the network. The suggested properties of such a body are:

Representativeness (of the network and well as member agencies).
Small size so as not to dictate the network agenda.
Sufficient power and size to be able to effectively perform the mandates of the network members. (NAFFE 2004)

Taking up the role of manager of a network of course carries with it the extra burden of added transaction costs and it is critical at the outset to consider the level of support you will have, and whether you will be able to sustain the role.

4.2 Role conflict and support

Organisational support is critical for the survival of networks and the development of trust between agencies that network on a regular basis. Two issues are important here. The recognition of the importance of maintaining informal networks that are critical to an organisational role, and the sanctioning of outputs of formal networks.

Cross et al. (2002), for example, consistently found during their research that an important predictor of the failure of collaborative efforts was a lack of social, technical, or organisational support provided to strategically important informal networks. Establishing this support is a challenge given that the intrinsic benefits of managing a wider network are often difficult to quantify or are not obvious in the short term – or, as noted above, managing networks is not seen as a legitimate part of a public actors substantive role.

Imperial & Hennessey (2000) found that, for some, collaboration was a source of decreased job satisfaction and motivation because they disliked working in teams; were frustrated with the political nature of these activities, or found endless meetings unproductive and a waste of time (and ‘not in the job description’). Factors such as increased workload and higher stress coupled with no corresponding increase in pay or recognition by upper management, they note, can be strong disincentives for participating in collaborative activities.

Cavaye (1999) argues for redefining the ‘real work’ of public servants to not only include the delivery of delegated services, but to do so in a way that supports community networks, partnership and capacity. This, he says, includes taking brokerage as normal practice and including a networking role, initiating contact with a greater diversity of clients, and co-ordination between agencies. The development of a ‘culture of collaboration’ within organisations that supports and rewards the engagement in networking activities, can create positive incentives for network managers (Imperial & Hennessey 2000).

Agency designation to a formal network, notes Agranoff (2003) usually brings a measure of delegated authority, that is, an ability to speak on behalf of and to commit agency resources. However, frequently public actors either misjudge or misrepresent the commitment of their agency, or the agency hierarchy itself does not understand or is not committed to the range of possible outcomes of network processes. This is particularly important for (regional) implementation managers who may be geographically and systemically separated from critical decision-makers. The outcomes of a long network process may simply be over-ruled. For example, Craig and Vanclay (2005) observe that 12 out of 36 Water Sharing Plans were appealed in the Land and Environment Court in New South Wales – thus adding to the overall costs of the process. Many committee members involved reported satisfaction with the processes, but not with the ultimate outcomes and suggested that the plan was ‘railroaded’ and the community process was only a ‘token gesture’.

Public actors have to juggle the dual role of committee member and their role as government officer and agency representatives can face a significant ‘crisis of loyalties’ (Craig & Vanclay 2005). Absolute surety that network outcomes will be accepted unconditionally is often impossible. However, a public actors should seek to establish, and be up-front about what is ‘not negotiable’, clarify the boundaries of government responsibility in respect to network outcomes, and even acknowledge the tensions that government actors face as a consequence of their dual role (Craig & Vanclay 2005).

Stakeholder dissatisfaction with the outcomes of network processes might be inevitable, especially where there is a significant compromise of aspirations. However, stakeholder dissatisfaction with the process of network management can have a significant long-term impact on the trust in government and its representatives.

4.3 The ‘special’ role of the public actor

Much of the literature on networks emphasises that government is just one of the players in a network. This note Klijn and Koppenjan neglects their role as ‘guardian of the public interest.’ But what is the nature of this role? Defining the public interest in terms of elected political representation, they note, is based on ‘an unrealistic and naïve assumption about the accumulation of preferences of citizens that has long since been falsified by theory and research’ (Klijn & Koppenjan 2000). However alternate perspectives, such as that of the ‘common interest’ are increasingly difficult to define in a society that is becoming progressively more complex and fragmented.

Many seem to agree that the role of public agencies in a network context is to ensure that processes are undertaken according to the rules of democracy. Public organisations suggest Kickert and Koppenjan (1997) are in an obvious position to safeguard the interests of unrepresented or under-represented groups and therefore public actors might be a far more suitable candidate for playing the role of network manager than other parties. However, as Klijn and Koppenjan point out, the ‘pragmatic choice’ of the public actor is not helpful. Frequently, several public actors are involved in decision-making processes so that it is often difficult to determine what ‘the public interest’ is (Klijn & Koppenjan 2000).

This, on the surface, suggests emphasis on the quality of network interactions. Network management is the means by which the quality and openness of the process – in terms of proportional representation, openness, equity, fairness etc. – can be achieved (Klijn & Koppenjan 2000). However, does this imply that public value can simply emerge from a ‘good’ process?

There is frequently tension between the requirement that public actors are ‘exemplary’ in their behaviour in terms of the democratic process and the requirement to efficiently deliver services or outcomes in their (narrow) functional role. For example, a commonly used tactic is that of selective ‘activation’ (or ‘deactivation’) of particular actors to facilitate the effective function of a network or to access particular resources. However, this is problematic argue De Bruijn and Ringling (1997) given civil rights such as the principle of non-discrimination. Network management for a public actor, therefore can be a constant balancing act between efficiency, effectiveness, legitimacy and this ‘special role’.

Research Gap: How is ‘public value’ defined? How might this inform a collaborative process, particularly one that might involve multiple government agencies? Does this imply a set of ‘rules’ or ‘guidelines’ that any networked public process must follow?

4.4 Personality and skill factors

How does a network manager’s perceptions of social structure, their personality, or their various ‘networking’ skills facilitate or hinder their activity in networks? Some work has been done in this area (see, for example, Krackhardt 1990; Burt et al. 1998; Casciaro 1998; Borgatti & Foster 2003) and findings have been somewhat inconsistent. A few important concepts are covered below.

4.4.1 Cognitive accuracy

Network researchers have demonstrated substantial discrepancies between records of social interaction and participant’s reports of those interactions (Breiger 2004). Work in this area suggests that individuals have dramatically different cognitive maps of the same network – a cognitive map consists of the individual’s ‘mental’ picture of a social system, for example, who is a friend (or enemy) of who (Kilduff & Tsai 2003). Importantly, accuracy of cognitive maps has been tied to (perceived) performance in networks. Those with more accurate maps of relevant social networks tended to be perceived as more powerful by their peers (Kilduff & Tsai 2003).

An individual who has an astute knowledge of where the network links are can have a substantial advantage notes Krackhardt (1990). This information can provide (amongst other things): a good assessment of who is powerful in the organisation; an idea of where the coalitions are; and, an overview of where the weaknesses are in political groups. Thus, understanding the network provides a source of power independent to the position of a person in a network (Krackhardt 1990). In simple terms, what you know about a network may be as important than who you are.

A number of case studies have demonstrated that the failure of an initiative was, at least in part, due to a poor understanding of the social/political structure in an organisation by its leadership (eg. see Borgatti & Foster 2003, p. 998; or Kilduff & Tsai 2003, p. 76).

4.4.2 Personality and networks

Kilduff and Tsai (2003), suggest that it is possible that a number of personality traits predispose individuals to create certain types of social network. They focused on ‘overwhelming evidence’ for the effect of ‘self monitoring’.

Self-monitoring individuals are willing and able to monitor and control their self-expression in social situations. They are able to present the right image for the right audience, whereas others insist on being themselves ‘no matter how incongruent their self-expression may be with the requirements of the social situation’ (Kilduff & Tsai 2003). Research has shown that high self-monitors tend to become ‘brokers’ in networks, providing important links to different people and groups, whereas low self-monitors tended to stay in more cohesive groups (Mehra, in Kilduff & Tsai 2003).

In another example that draws also on notions of cognitive accuracy in networks, Newcomb (in Kilduff & Tsai 2003) demonstrated that people with authoritarian personalities overestimated the degree to which others shared their opinions and reciprocated their liking. They tended to build asymmetric social networks characterised by a lack of reciprocity in working relationships.

Cascario (1998) found that ‘motivational traits’ also play a significant role in predicting cognitive accuracy in social relationships. In her study, she found that the need for achievement had a positive effect on accuracy in friendship and advice networks. Highly motivated people saw important advantages in greater attention to both formal and informal networks as sources of work-related advice and for evaluation of their performance.

4.4.3 Some empirical evidence

In research with ‘network managers’ undertaken for the CRC for Irrigation Futures, Lourey and Howden (2005) found considerable differences between interview subjects on how they understood, and managed their networks (albeit with a small sample size: n=3). For example, one had an astute understanding of the ‘resources’ available in their network, while another seemed oblivious to the social influences on critical events. One recognised contacts for their strategic value, while another favoured contacts they ‘liked’ rather than considering whether they were resources they ‘needed’. These results correlated with the unsolicited observation of one key informant that one of the interviewees was a ‘good networker’. Their research provides some support for the idea that those individuals better able to understand the networks within which they operate are more effective and viewed more positively by others.

4.4.4 Networking as a competency

Cascario (1998) suggests that differences in people’s perception of networks, and thus variability in accuracy, are a function of both cognitive processing and knowledge, and position in the social structure. Thus it appears that at least some components of network knowledge can be improved by deliberate attention. Burt (2006), for example, argues that skills in ‘seeing’ networks can be taught and abilities in operating in them improved. He teaches corporate executives in the United States to ‘see social capital’.

At the very least these factors suggest that there is great value in expending effort on getting to know networks that are important to you, the people in them, their relationships, and identifying opportunities to improve the functioning of your network.

5 Evaluating network action

Most authors warn that traditional evaluation criteria such as goal attainment or the general/public interest are not adequate. Klijn and Teisman (1997) argue that adequate evaluation ‘yardstick’ should ‘take into consideration the fact that various actors with diverging interests interact, that objectives are difficult to measure, that objectives shift and that the interests of those involved may be overlooked.’ The solution they claim is found in the ex-post-satisfying criterion, which means that the starting point of assessment is based on the subjective judgements of individual actors.

Klijn and Teisman (1997) suggest that, in a network context, the quality of the outcome depends on the quality of the process. They outline three criteria to evaluate the process of the network activity:

A. how has it enriched the target (outcome?) set at the beginning;

B. what is the quality of the interaction — the ‘linking’ activities;

C. what is the quality of the structure of the process — to what extent have the actors developed effective arrangements to organise their mutual interaction

However, it is not a matter of simply aggregating judgements. For example, some issues that might emerge (modified, from Kickert et al. 1997c):

Are all the judgements equal? Or is someone’s judgement more ‘equal’ than another’s?
What if the majority are satisfied, but others bear costs?
What if some costs are shifted to those outside the network (third parties) – how is this included in the evaluation?
Are there real increases in benefits derived from participation in the network (compared to not participating)? Or is it a lowering of aspirations?

Provan and Milward, for example, note that clients represent only one group of constituents, and for the public sector, they might not even be the most critical stakeholder group. Additionally, network success may come at a cost too high (in terms of transaction costs) to sustain the involvement of individual network members, or may raise substantial problems in terms of resource sharing, political turf battles and regulatory differences (Provan & Milward 2001).

Evaluation must be context dependent and may involve multiple levels of measurement, which is likely to be very resource intensive. A useful approach might be to link the outcomes of a network approach to the notion of public value. Imperial and Hennessey (2000) provide a list of ‘potential sources of public value’ (Table 2) that might be apparent in a network process. This list attempts to cover the range of levels at which evaluation might be important.

Research gap: Further research into the evaluation of network processes might be valuable in ORL 5.1. Particularly the idea of linking this to concepts of public value might provide insights into some simple guidelines that a network manager might apply during a process.

Table 1: Potential Sources of Public Value from Collaboration

Level	Public Value
Individual	Increased job satisfaction Increased motivation Learning, adaptation, and change Learn new skills (e.g., professional development) Better decisions & judgment Improved job performance Social capital Social networks among individuals results in trust, reciprocity, and reputation
Organizational	Additional policy outputs Learning, adaptation, and change Innovation adoption & policy change (e.g., organizational change) Organizational learning (e.g., collaborative know how) Policy-oriented learning Increased organizational capacity Increase organizational efficiency/effectiveness (e.g., improved service delivery) Improved decision making & resource allocation (e.g., improved program management) Develop new programs or modify mission (e.g., ability to survive and flourish) Leveraging new resources Improved internal and external communication Social capital Social networks among organizations results in trust, reciprocity, and reputation
Network	Additional policy outputs Learning, adaptation, and change Innovation generation and diffusion Policy-oriented learning Increased network capacity Increased communication among network members Policy integration (e.g., coordination & shared policies) Leveraging resources for the network or its members Leveraging policy networks (e.g., improved lobbying) Social capital Social and organizational networks results in trust, reciprocity, and reputation Institutional infrastructure
Societal	Improved policy outcomes Policy-oriented learning Social capital Social and organizational networks result in trust, reciprocity, and reputation Institutional infrastructure Increased civil society Citizen involvement in government institutions, volunteerism Develop new institutions (e.g., NGOs) Improved political representation and accountability Citizen satisfaction with government institutions
(from Imperial & Hennessey 2000)

6 Operating in networks – emerging areas of intervention

There are many ways to consider social complexity when considering how to respond to a challenging network situation. The various chapters in Kickert et al. (1997b), for example, variously frame their analyses of networks from the perspective of points of intervention (ideas, interactions or institutions); the level of network management (the ‘game’ or the network); or the perspective from which the management strategy comes (instrumental, interactive or institutional). Previous work in ORL 5.1 has experimented with a number of configurations of the tools in Kickert et al. (see Gooey 2005; Hulme 2006b; Patterson-Majoor & Hulme 2006). Other potential approaches are also in development in ORL 5.1. These are briefly described below.

The intervention points of interactions (actors) and ideas are common in the literature (see, for example, Howlett 2001), and Ostrom (1990) has built a strong case for the development of institutions as a means of governing collective action. Importantly, government actors have to both established and manage networks for a particular outcome, and represent organisational goals in networks they have been invited to participate in (where another agency is the notional ‘manager’). In both cases public actors may seek to variously work on the whole network structure, or work in the network (the game) on interactions between actors to ‘manage’ the network in order to meet their needs.

The three intervention points and two levels of action provide the basis for a matrix developed by Kickert et al. (1997b) for the articulation of six ‘tools’ that a public actor can use to manage networks.

Table 2: Management strategies in networks

	Perceptions	Actors	Institutions
Game (interactions)	Covenanting	Selective (de)activation	Arranging
Network	Reframing	Network (de) activation	Constitutional reform
		(modified, from Klijn & Teisman 1997)

The six strategic tools are summarised below:

Acting in the network

These strategies are largely short term and are aimed at increasing your own and collective understanding of the network systems, as well as influencing perceptions and processes in order to ensure you position is appropriately represented. These strategies, for example, may be aimed at influencing change in regard to one issue or problem area in the network in which there is a deadlock.

Covenanting or Synthesising (ideas): involves exploring the similarities and differences in actors’ perceptions and the opportunities that exist for goal convergence.

Examples include:

Building trust and rapport with key players and seeking to understand their perspectives.
Provide quality information about the issue, such as research, positioning papers, relevant facts and figures, or through workshops or meetings.
Provide clarity about desired outcomes and the benefits of collaborative action.
Encourage dialogue or collaboration between individuals where differences may be apparent or commitment low.

Selective (de)activation (actors): involves activating actors within or external to the network who possess critical resources (such as money, information, power, or influence) that may assist you to meet network objectives or to tackle particular problems. In some cases it may also involve deactivating (or blocking, or working around) an actor who may be inhibiting you from achieving objectives, or at the end of a phase when the goals of the network change and an actor is no longer necessary.

Examples include:

Identify and facilitate leadership roles for those with critical knowledge, or the respect of other players.
Encourage greater participation (perhaps through incentives) of a player with influence on resources or potential supporters.
Organise ‘confrontation’ to shift fixed views or unblock a closed circuit (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997).
Arrange meetings so that ‘blockers’ are placed together with network advocates.

Arranging (institutions): involves facilitating the interaction processes to influence the culture and structure of a network so that transaction costs can be reduced.

Examples include:

Improving the interactions of actors to increase efficiency
Ensuring the timing of events is efficient and make sense
Develop project groups so that members do not go to unnecessary meetings
Create an e-network or other appropriate process to smooth communication
Develop protocols to bound the time actors meet or need to put in
Set some rules about the structure and culture of the network so that it runs as effectively and smoothly as possible and is not sidetracked into irrelevances.

Importantly, these processes are not aimed at manipulating towards pre-existing goals, but matching problems, solutions or actors, improving function, or (subtly) shifting a system that may be stagnant, too conservative, or deadlocked.

Acting on the network

These processes tend to be more active and overt, take time to establish and have more lasting consequences. You might do this if there is a mismatch between the goals of the network and the resources available through participants, or if the network is significantly deadlocked on an issue or is working inefficiently.

Reframing (ideas): Reframing involves influencing the actors’ perceptions regarding the nature of the target problem or the purpose of the network. Battles over the framing of issues are common in public policy, for example, whether the exclusion of cattle from alpine pastures is an issue of conservation (protecting the environment) or heritage (protecting the livelihoods of mountain cattlemen). The image of the ‘Man from Snowy River’ is a powerful cultural image evoked to support the latter view – the State rolled out sporting icons to support the former. Reframing goes beyond facilitating reflection and is aimed at a ‘paradigmatic shift’.

Examples include:

Write a paper or develop a presentation to better explain an issue in terms tailored to the audience.
Introduce a radical new way of seeing the issue, perhaps by promoting marginal views, to shift thinking to a bigger picture.
Encourage processes that bring together divergent views in a way that encourages ‘constructive controversy’ (rather than conflict).

Network (de)activation (actors): refers to bringing in new actors or changing positions of existing actors to influence network function or direction. It also may also refer to the removal of an actor in the network.

Examples include:

Activate a member from higher level of government to improve perceptions of support for the network (or imply potential government ‘takeover’ of a dysfunctional or deadlocked network)
Bring together the ‘experts’ to get them active on a particular issue.
Bring in a new player to shift a dominant coalition who may be blocking agreement.
Introduce experts with different views to shift stagnant thinking.

Constitutional reform (institutions): aims to change the structure of the network by the introduction of new rules and the reallocation of resources. This includes more permanent organisational procedures that influence interactions between actors. As noted above, strategies of this type likely impact on existing social capital in a network and must be used with caution.

Examples include:

Create a steering committee
Set down clear rules of behaviour (eg. conflict regulation)
Implement new regulations
Create a new network or divide an existing network into clearer functional roles.

Research Gap: The use of incentives and (second-generation) governance instruments has not been explored here. Used appropriately, they are an important tool for a network manager. Some work has been done in this area (see de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof 1997), but further work will likely be needed to elaborate the scope of these tools.

Again, these techniques can only be used with the consent of network members (even if implicit). While they may appear to be instrumental and top down, they should be seen as facilitating, or as guided mediation aimed at achieving robustness, openness, pluralism, and as developing capabilities (Kickert et al. 1997c), while sustaining willingness to be involved and invest in networks. An appearance of manipulation can effect trust and ultimately the effectiveness of the network.

Figure 2 (pers. com. Patterson-Majoor) provides a visual conceptualisation of this matrix which is being utilised in network management framework developed by Patterson-Majoor and Hulme (2006).

Figure 2: A model of the ‘tools’ available to a network manager

What is not clear in the above set of tactics is the process of gaining and maintaining (external) support for the network – although it could be seen as part of network activation. Elsewhere (eg. Kickert & Koppenjan 1997; Agranoff & McGuire 2001; McGuire 2002; Agranoff 2003), the concept of ‘mobilisation’ is used to refer to the process of developing commitment and support from external stakeholders (as well as internal network participants), although the concept is not used consistently across authors. Here mobilising will be used for tactics designed to secure and maintain support for the network from external stakeholders, both in terms of authority and resources.

Below is a summary of a range of other tools and perspectives in development in ORL 5.1 or that have been investigated as part of the project. The various ‘types’ of network that a manager might face will be explored below as a starting point for analysis and to begin the processes of linking the network work to the Outcomes Framework.

The tactics above, along with those gleaned from the literature, and the tools explored below are summarised in a table (Appendix 1) that will inform future research with a range of DPI staff in network management roles in complex and contested program and policy networks.

6.1 Stakeholder analysis

Brown (n.d.) suggest that a stakeholder analysis is an important first step in the process of analysing a network. The most common stakeholder analysis tools, however, more usefully suit the identification and management of stakeholders involved in the production of discrete outputs, rather than of outcomes or where the product of interaction is uncertain. To that end, Brown suggests including questions for each stakeholder around the core values they might hold, and the range of ‘ideas’ (eg. about what ‘sustainability’ is) that might be ‘negotiated and contested’ in the network arena.

This analysis can be conducted by the network manager as a preliminary scoping tool to help identify potential participants, or perhaps more productively, in a workshop with a range of organisational people, or close allies, that know the network in question.

Necessarily, such tools used in this way can only give one perspective on the network. As noted above, the perspectives of other actors in the network are not always clearly understood, or are often misunderstood. It is also difficult, if not impossible, to predict how perspectives will change over time in interactions in the network.

6.2 Rapid Assessment Tool

Hulme (2006a) has developed a ‘Rapid Assessment Tool’ based on the VicHealth’s Partnerships Analysis Tool. This tool is much more comprehensive than any stakeholder analysis process and much more directed to the issues of managing complex networks. The Rapid Assessment Tool can also be used as a ‘check-list’ for a network manager, as a survey instrument, or in a workshop process with network members. It is designed to assess the function of a network – where it is working well and where its performance could be improved – for example by improving links between members and bringing in new skills or resources.

Likely this tool may only be appropriate in a well-established network where there is collective interest in improving network performance. In networks where there is conflict or limited trust, this might not be seen as a legitimate activity and some might find it confronting. Actors might not feel comfortable disclosing the ‘real’ nature of their relationships with others in the network. Additionally, where respondents have identified problems in a network, follow-up interviews might be desirable to identify the ‘real’ cause of conflict. Whether a public actor and/or a member of the network is the right person to conduct this work is also an issue.

6.3 Network Management Framework

This is the most well developed tool being utilised by the ORL 5.1 team. The Network Management Framework (NMF) is designed for use in Strategic Policy Division to assist policy officers in identifying and analysing their networks. The Framework was first developed by Gooey (2005), and has evolved through the work of Patterson-Majoor and Hulme (2006, see also Hulme 2006). The NMF has been used in a two-hour workshop format with policy officers to scope an emerging policy issue. The NMF, which is now a stand-alone workbook, steps users through processes of clarifying their objectives, management tasks required, current network structure, and questions about whether that structure is appropriate or could be improved. It then focuses on strategies (based on the Klijn & Teisman (1997) framework see figure 2 above) to focus attention on improving the function of the network.

Again, this is not a whole-of-network tool, but a user-friendly instrument designed to give some rigour to how policy officers go about planning policy processes.

6.4 Network survey

Provan et al. (2005) also outline a network analysis tool designed for communities to build their capacity to address community resources needs. They begin from a formal Social Network Analysis (SNA) process (which undoubtedly would need to be done by a practitioner), but provide eight questions (Table 4, below) that guide communities in using the results of network analysis to build their partnerships.

Importantly, there is recognition that networks evolve over time (questions 6, 7 & 8) and that continuous monitoring of the network is important. Provan et al. (2005) also recognise the limitations of SNA and provides a survey instrument to gather data from collaborative organisations. This includes questions on the types of information and resources shared, and the benefits and the drawbacks of the relationship.

Table 3: Questions for Communities Based on Network Analysis

Which community agencies are most central in the network, and are these agencies essential for addressing community needs?
Which core network members have links to important resources through their involvement with organisations outside the network?
Are critical network ties based solely on personal relationships, or have they become formalised so that they are sustainable over time?
Are some network relationships strong while others are weak? Should those relationships that are weak be maintained as is, or should they be strengthened?
Which subgroups of network organisations have strong working relationships? How can these groups be mobilised to meet the broader objectives of the network?
Based on comparative network data over time, has reasonable progress been made in building community capacity through developing stronger network ties?
What is the level of trust among agencies working together, and has it increased or decreased over time? If it has declined, how can it be strengthened?
What have been the benefits and drawbacks of collaboration, have these changed over time, and how can benefits be enhanced and drawbacks minimised?

(Provan et al. 2005)

6.5 Social Network Analysis

Advocates of SNA suggest that one benefit of network analysis tools is that they can uncover network relations that enable or constrain networks, which might not be revealed in participatory or other qualitative processes. One reason is that individuals may not reveal their true feelings about network relationships, for strategic or personal reasons. SNA can reveal, they suggest, the ‘true picture’ (eg. see figure 3) of a network and the manager’s position in it, not just from their own perspective, but from other actor’s perspectives (Provan et al. 2005).

A down side is that SNA is complex and requires someone skilled in the theory and the use of the software. It is also resource intensive (requiring extensive surveys, for example) and therefore is not applicable to many of the (smaller or day-to-day) network situations DPI staff find themselves in. It is also just one perspective on the analysis of networks, criticised (as noted above) by a number of authors for its inadequate conceptualisations of human agency and culture (Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994).

SNA would therefore be likely more informative and effective if augmented with qualitative surveys to gather evidence of the cultural aspect of the network and to explore ‘anomalies’ revealed by the SNA process. This work would also need to be repeated over time to understand the temporal aspects of the network process. The costs may be prohibitive in a lot of cases.

Figure 3: Hypothetical example to demonstrate visual representation of a network.

With the above reservations noted, a number of authors have reported the value of the visual representation of networks for generating discussion and insights. Cross et al. (2002), for example, observe that ‘rich discussions’ will often evolve by showing network diagrams (like figure 3, above) to the members of a group and asking them to diagnose the patterns. However, one would need to be careful how this method was applied as it may reveal roles and relationship that may embarrass network members.

Others (Scott 2000; Colliver 2001a; Colliver 2001b; Cross et al. 2002; Coviello 2005) report that network diagrams are a powerful tool for individuals to actively engage with and shape their personal networks. They advocate, for example, creating ‘colourful’ maps of their networks, showing linkages, roles and resources and putting them on display.
This exercise has three effects notes Colliver (2001a)

A. You realise who you know, which leads you to use your connections more;

B. You see the relationships of influence between people, which leads you to be more selective about who you invest time in;

C. You realise that you haven’t spoken to 80% of these people in the last year, which either makes you feel guilty, or makes you appreciate the big return you’d get from putting time into keeping in contact.

Visual mapping can be done by software (eg. KrackPlot or Netdraw), or by basic computer drawing or plotting software (eg. SmartDraw). However, simple whiteboard or ‘craft’ techniques have proved useful in processes run with the Horticulture group in DPI and in the research conducted by Lourey and Howden (2005).

6.6 Network ‘type’ as starting point

As noted above, while there is a lot of work on the analysis of networks, and some frameworks for understanding networks, there are no (or few) managerial rules to guide a network manager in choosing one activity over another, or in their allocation of limited resources (including their time) on these activities (McGuire 2002), particularly when faced with social complexity.

McGuire (2002) has developed some ‘audacious speculation’ on strategies for some network situations:

A. In a technical environment with clear objectives, broad support, and ample resources, high levels of goals consensus and a lack of contentiousness among members.
> Activate the network > Mobilise commitment > Frame the operating structures and rules > and then Synthesise interaction into a productive whole.

B. Where lacking broad based support.
> Activation > Mobilisation > Deactivation > Mobilisation > Activation.

C. Where immediate goal achievement is impossible due to lack of goal consensus and perhaps undesirable if the network must build long term linkages within a community. Network level ‘soul searching’ defines the network activities and framing strategies dominate.
> Activation > Framing > Motivation > Synthesising > Framing.

While this may seem largely unintelligible to a reader unfamiliar with the network terminology, of importance is, in McGuire’s (2002) words, the simple contingency logic used as a tool for magnifying a process that seems ‘too complicated to comprehend’.

The network type, or situation, provides an entry point to link the range of network management strategies to the Outcomes Framework (Johnson et al. 2005). Such a process would recognise the broad network contexts that DPI managers may operate in, and perhaps more importantly reduce the number of tools that managers have to use by identifying those relevant in each network context.

A preliminary list of network entry points is below:

A. Intermittent (emergency) networks – clear statutory responsibilities; relatively defined network, but infrequently activated; sometimes informal agreements on roles or lack of clarity on precise responsibilities; possible issue to do with maintaining skills and responsiveness over time.

B. Action network – clear, but short-term, program/project responsibilities (perhaps with the need to ensure the network persists when you withdraw); clear understanding of goals and performance measures; relatively defined network; but many actors with differing business/personal goals.

C. Programmatic network – complex problem; some agreement on the causes of the problem and the need to work together to solve it; multiple and competing goals; sometimes poorly defined network; a focus on aligning goals before action.

D. Passive learning network – wicked problem; conflicting understanding of causes and solutions; poorly defined and emergent network; focus on learning about perspectives and developing consensus on roles and long term approaches to ameliorate the problem.

E. Contingent network – no clear goal, but network defined by the current and future resource and knowledge needs of an individual’s role; very broadly defined network of key contacts providing ‘intelligence’, information and advice, or ‘weak ties’ to potentially useful resources; focus on increasing flexibility and the ability to respond to emerging issues.

This is, of course, is a rough typology (to be tested) and does not represent a mutually exclusive categorisation. Some of these network types may operate concurrently within the same program or policy area, or perhaps nested within each other. Network type ‘E’, for example, may be applicable to most situations and may not represent a distinct area of intervention.

7 Concluding thoughts – network management as reflexive action

Reading above, one will be forgiven for thinking that the role of the network manager is impossibly complex. Jackson and Stainsbury (2000), however, warn about searching for the chimera of the ‘ideal network structure’. There is no such thing as the one best way to organise a network they note, rather the best structure is that which is fit for purpose and which minimises losses (costs). This requires a deep understanding of the purpose of the network, and suggests a range of adaptive and reflexive skills that might need to be developed in DPI staff working in complex networks.

Importantly also, while the network is an important emerging model to deal with complex and wicked governance issues, it not a panacea. It should only be valued in so far as it produces better results than can be achieved without it. Planning and market approaches are also needed to provide ‘policy balance’ (Adams & Hess 2001). The failure of network collaboration may have more dire consequences than the application of ineffective authoritative approaches, in loss of trust, damage to government reputation, and the weakening of ‘bridges’ between groups that may be essential to solve future complex NRM issues.

The literature on the network approach is clear, that network management is far from easy, that collaboration is often a trial and error process (Imperial & Hennessey 2000), and that people may have to ‘fail’ into collaboration (Roberts 2000). As Bardach (1998) notes, the most imaginative practitioner will still be constrained by the realities of a federal system that places the various levels of government in conflict with one another, and that creates a tension between core duties and the need to deal with complex problems. Further, he notes, no amount of creativity will overcome the shortage of resources (e.g., staff, money, etc.) that is an obstacle to collective action.

Nonetheless, suggest Keast et al. (2004), faced with increase evidence of the benefits of network structures, decision-makers may be willing to make some ‘changes at the margins’– including longer timeframes for evaluation, changed perceptions about each other’s contribution to the whole, and recognition of the value of relationship building. The problem is that the range of complex problems facing government today may require a paradigmatic change in the way we do business.

The concern in this research sub-project, is to lay the groundwork for the development of a framework or rules-of-thumb for public officers operating in complex networks. To that end it needs to draw on ‘real’ examples from DPI, and be free of the jargon that pervades much work in this area, so that it can be applicable across the range of roles DPI people undertake. Given that network management is an ongoing process – because of the emergent nature of the complex environments – it also makes little sense to see the role of network manager as anything other than something that will have to be continually developed over time. A concern, however, is that the tools outlined above will become a one-time ‘tick-off’ in a project rather than as a process to increase understanding.

In dealing with complexity Senge (in McKelvey et al. 1998) suggest that the best practitioners are ‘theorists’. That is, ‘they are thinking: What are my assumptions behind these actions? Why does one strategy make more sense than another, in terms of the world-view that it is based on? The continual reflective inquiry into that view is critical to their work.’

Similarly, Weick (1993) refers to the need for ‘wisdom’ in the context of a ‘fluid’ world of temporary systems, intergroup dynamics and team building.

Wisdom is … not a belief, a value, a set of facts, a corpus of knowledge or information in some specialized area, or a set of special abilities or skills. Wisdom is an attitude taken by persons toward the beliefs, values, knowledge, information, abilities, and skills that are held, a tendency to doubt that these are necessarily true or valid and to doubt that they are an exhaustive set of those things that could be known (Weick 1993)

As research into network management has progressed during the ORL 5.1 program it has become increasingly clear that the skills of the network manager are at least as important as the development of processes and tools. The issue will be how to build the appropriate ‘requisite variety’ in the skills of network practitioners and the organisational systems they have to work in.

Ongoing research in this program then will investigate ways of building the reflexive abilities of network managers – in short, their ability to see and utilise social capital.

8 Glossary

Conventions	Are understandings, often tacit but also conscious, that organise and coordinate action in predictable ways – related concepts include habits, customs, routines, and standard practices (Biggart & Beamish 2003). Conventions are more localised and context dependent than ‘institutions’, and are considered by theorists to be institutions writ small.
Collaboration	Often interchangeable with many ideas of networks, and has been defined as any joint activity by two or more organisations intended to create public value by working together rather than separately (Imperial 2005).
Discourse	System of ideas or knowledge transmitted through a specific vocabulary within a certain historical, social and cultural context, with formal and informal rules, and therefore exclusions and assumptions.
Governance	Can be described as ‘directed influence of societal processes’ and includes all kinds of guidance mechanisms connected to public policy processes – not restricted to conscious or deliberate mechanisms, but also self-steering processes (Kickert et al. 1997a)
Human capital	The knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic well-being (OECD, in Gooey & Howden 2004b)
Institutions	The culturally embedded and taken-for-granted formal and informal rules, norms and customs that define appropriate behaviour and guide interpretation of the structures and practices that exist in the social world.
Networks	A public policy making and implementation (social) system involving multiple nodes (individuals, agencies and organisations) with multiple linkages – not just informal patterns of interaction, but also structures through which public goods and services are planned, designed and produced and delivered (modified from McGuire 2002).
Networking	Describes the ‘everyday’ process by which people interact and make formal and informal connections (eg. at a conference). Networking can be part of a management process, but should not be mistaken for the task of network management.
Network management	Influencing shared understanding and/or collective action between a range of disparate, but interdependent, actors to achieve outcomes (in the broadest sense) in an arena in which there might be conflicting goals, understanding of causes and/or potential approaches to their solution.
Partnerships	While similar to collaboration and networks, the literature on partnerships seems to focus on formal dyadic relationships (one on one) between organisations, whereas collaboration and networks seems to refer to the whole system of ‘shared’ action, in a specific context.
Public management	Differs from governance in that it focuses on the consciously and deliberately undertaken actions of public managers to influence societal processes. Therefore, public management is governance, but not all governance is public management (Kickert et al. 1997a).
Social capital	Refers to the networks of social relations that provide access to needed resources and supports (PRI 2003; Gooey & Howden 2004b)
Wicked problems	Fluid, complex, political, and frustrating problems with are not ‘owned’ by a single agent; not easily defined; nor are they (easily) solvable, many involve high levels of conflict amongst stakeholders and tend to require joint action from government, industry, community and individuals.

9 Some Further Reading

Networks

For a very readable overview of the range of research into networks, see (Watts 2003).
For the application of network theory to organisational research, see (Kilduff & Tsai 2003).
For a broad overview of the application of Social Network Analysis, see (Breiger 2004).
For a more comprehensive overview of the range of paradigms in network research, see (Borgatti & Foster 2003; Hulme 2006b).

Networks for Managers

For one perspective on the network challenges facing public managers, see (Agranoff 2003).

Network Governance

For an overview of recent developments in public sector governance, and the rise of network governance, see (Petris 2005).

Social Capital

For more detail on the structural (network) conceptualisation of social capital, and a discussion on the value of social capital to DPI, see (Gooey & Howden 2004b; PRI 2005).

Trust

For some Australian research on the link between trust and social capital, see (Fattore et al. 2003).

Wicked Problems

For more detail on the complexities of wicked problems, see (Conklin 2001; Gooey & Howden 2004a; Gooey 2005).

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APPENDIX 1 Draft Table of Tactics for Operating in Complex Networks

Click to view

Department of Primary Industries

agriculture

Understanding and Operating in Complex Networks: a Focus on the Role of the ‘Networker’

Author:

Acknowledgments:

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables

1 Introduction

1.1 Some emerging challenges

1.2 The layout of this paper

2 Why networks?

2.1 What is a network?

2.2 When is a ‘network’ approach useful?

2.3 Some pros and cons

2.3.1 The benefits of a network approach

2.3.2 The challenges of networks

2.4 Why do networks need ‘managing’?

3 Understanding networks

3.1 Structural factors and SNA

3.2 Cognition factors

3.2.1 Culture and cognition influences on networks

3.3 Other ‘social’ factors

3.3.1 Trust

3.3.2 Diversity

3.3.3 Conflict

3.4 Institutions and other ‘structural’ factors

3.4.1 On ANT, inertia and entrepreneurs

3.4.2 Tinkering with structure

3.5 Networks as capital

3.6 Contextual factors

3.6.1 Historical influences

3.6.2 Political influence and support

3.6.3 Other contextual factors

4 The network manager – skills, roles and challenges

4.1 ‘Leadership’ roles

4.1.1 A note on transaction costs

4.2 Role conflict and support

4.3 The ‘special’ role of the public actor

4.4 Personality and skill factors

4.4.1 Cognitive accuracy

4.4.2 Personality and networks

4.4.3 Some empirical evidence

4.4.4 Networking as a competency

5 Evaluating network action

6 Operating in networks – emerging areas of intervention

6.1 Stakeholder analysis

6.2 Rapid Assessment Tool

6.3 Network Management Framework

6.4 Network survey

6.5 Social Network Analysis

6.6 Network ‘type’ as starting point

7 Concluding thoughts – network management as reflexive action

8 Glossary

9 Some Further Reading

10 Reference List

APPENDIX 1 Draft Table of Tactics for Operating in Complex Networks