Back
to Top

Skip to main content
 
  • Share this page on Facebook
  • Print this page

Salt Property Rights to Manage Saline Impacts from Irrigation,a Policy Design Economic Experiment.

February 2004

1. Background

The Policy Design Economic Experiment described here forms a continuing body of joint research between the Victorian Department of Primary Industries, Economics Branch; the University of Melbourne, Economic Theory Centre, and Purdue University, Krannert School of Management.

This paper describes a Salt Market Policy Design Experiment. The research will inform the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, Market Based Instruments Pilots Program1

The application of economic experiments to the exploration, 'testbedding'2 and illustration of new regulations and policies is a new and exciting area in public policy development and applied economics. Knowledge innovations in the areas of strategic incentive interactions, environmental cause and effect modelling and information technology, enable experimental economics to now be used in a meaningful way to predict responses to government policy.

Economic experiments have been used to inform the design of the United States National Sulphur Dioxide Trading Program3, Los Angles RECLAIM4 and the Victorian BushTender5.

The Salt Market Experiment aims to inform jurisdictions involved in achieving the NAP, about the expected response of individuals, groups and institutions to salinity policies. Three salt policy scenarios are implemented in the laboratory. Participants make management decisions under controlled and replicable environments. These environments mimic the resources and payoffs that parties would face were government to take such actions in the field.

Economic experiments provide governments a tool to help delineate the drivers of individual and group behaviour under different policy settings. Experiments mitigate the risk of costly policy failure and enable governments to expand their policy toolkit and find innovative methods for dealing with policy questions.

2. Introduction

Through the decisions they make, individuals and their actions shape the ultimate outcomes that can be observed across the economy. Individual behaviour occurs and interacts in a complex manner across a range of groups including consumers, producers, regulators, policy-makers and community organisations more broadly.

Behaviour depends on the forces that the relevant group faces, the incentives they have for pursuing particular objectives, and also the unpredictability of human nature.

For example, farmers make decisions about their land use based on consideration of what return they will receive from various uses (in turn dependent on consumer demands), availability of crucial inputs such as water, and any government attempt to influence behaviour through regulation or other programs. In turn, these decisions determine the nature and extent of any water and land degradation and any changes over time to the number and variety of flora and fauna species that can be supported by the land and rivers. The nature of the interaction is iterative, the ultimate outcomesdepend on the behaviour of all parties together.

There can be difficulty in both understanding how individuals will behave, and how the behaviour will interact. These difficulties pose significant problems in identifying the best actions for government as it is often hard to predict just how various individuals and groups will react to new policy settings. Given the significant resources devoted to government policy, it is important to get a robust picture of likely outcomes.

Economics is a discipline that attempts to build frameworks to better understand the major drivers underpinning behaviour by individuals and groups. To the extent that this is achieved, it can assist in better targeting government policy and improve living standards for the community in general.

An innovative new branch of economics – commonly labelled 'experimental economics' – provides a richer means of predicting behaviour compared to traditional approaches. Experimental economics more explicitly factors in the range of competing interests that parties have, and the sometimes unpredictable nature of human behaviour.

It couples intense theoretical research with actual testing (or 'experiments') that seeks to replicate real-world situations and as a result provide meaningful insight into policy design. Participants in the experiments receive actual financial payments to mimic the payoffs that parties would face were government to take such action.

The experiments take place under controlled 'laboratory' conditions, which has benefits in terms of:

being able to delineate the drivers of most importance and of lesser importance;

related, being able to vary some conditions while holding otheronstant, in orderto isolate the particular influence of particular factors;

facilitate tests for robustness of results by repeating experiments and checking the replicability. This is of particular importance because traditionally, as economics is a social science, it has not been possible to conduct tests of outcomes ahead of time. And it is clearly infeasible given their cost to undertake policy actions across the economy simply to better understand the outcomes; and

provide data for analysis and decision-making more akin to the rigorousapproaches used in physical science disciplines.

The application of economic experiments to salinity represents part of a developing Australian capability in the use of experiments for government policy development. It is important that national skills are harnessed and expanded in this area. Along with local knowledge, established networks with international expertise can grow this technology and provide meaningful insights to public policy.

3. Water property rights

Irrigation practices can impact upon salt concentrations in waterways. Excess water can enter the groundwater system via vertical drainage; depending on soil type, gradient and distance from watercourse, salt contained in the soils and groundwater is moved towards the river.

River salt concentrations have both internal and external costs to users of the river. Saline water can damage crops, cause local groundwater to rise and erode infrastructure. Downstream users incur higher salt concentrations and fewer return flows.

Water right allocations impact upon the flow of water in our rivers. The change in flow has both internal and external costs and benefits. More secure water rights in the Sunraysia region have supported growth in high value horticulture. The growth in net water transfers into the region (approximately 7,500ML per year, Russell, pers comm. 2003) does however increase future salt loads reaching the river.

Natural resources such as water have traditionally been poorly managed by the real economy. Water in the past has been managed as shared property: The growth in competing uses, however, made this allocation untenable. Water scarcity prompted the development of water transfer processes. These markets allowed the re-allocation of water from low to higher value uses.

Water property rights in well designed markets reveal competing users' value for the shared resource. The market allows users to signal their willingness to pay for the resource and broadcasts the cost of supply to all users. Water rights can effectively reveal the cost of changing water quantities in different locations within a hydrogeographic region.

Water property rights alone do not, however, reveal an important piece of missing information. Changing water allocations (also) impacts upon water quality. Water property rights do not effectively reveal the cost of salinity to different groups in the economy.

The user of a water right will take into account the price they must pay to use the water. They will compare the water price to the expected return they will receive from that water. They will purchase water rights as long as the expected return is greater than the cost.

The cost of a water right – the price – reflects the scarcity of water quantity. The irrigator, for example, will consider the scarcity of water in all production decisions. The price of water does not, however, inform users about the scarcity of water quality.

4. Salt Policy

The way communities and governments effectively manage salinity depends on the characteristics of land, water and production systems in different locations. Advances in knowledge about water and land systems can inform governments about the complex interactions in land and water systems. Water markets can inform competing parties about the cost of water in different uses. Salt management policies can inform groups and individuals about the range of competing interests over the resource. How effectively salt management policies reveal the benefits and costs of salt impacts depends on the compatibility between the characteristics of these systems and the
policy toolkit used.

4.1 The Victorian Mallee, Sunraysia

The Sunraysia region in the Mallee is a collection of irrigation districts and private irrigators located along the Murray River from Nyah to the South Australian boarder. It includes the city of Mildura, and regional production is characterised by high value horticulture and wine grapes. Irrigation methods vary between lower efficiency flood systems to pressurised spray and drip methods (SunRise 21). The region is characterised by a significant gradient change several kilometres from the Murray River. The steep gradient towards the river means groundwater and surface run-off has a larger impact on river salinity, across the sand dunes the gradient falls away from the river meaning salt impacts on the river are negligible (Cooke, 2003, pers comm.).

Modelling of land type and groundwater systems in the region enable government to estimate location specific impacts on salinity (SKM 2001). The interactions between irrigation and salt concentrations in the river have been grouped, and five separate salinity impact zones have been created (DNRE, 2001).

Figure 1 shows the region, main irrigation areas and the five salinity impact zones.

Figure1: Nyah to the South Australian Border.
Figure1: Nyah to the South Australian Border

Low impact zones 1 is the lowest impact zones. The gradient across the sand dunes falls away from the river towards the plains. The high impact zone is characterised by a steeper gradient, water flows faster through the groundwater system laterally towards the river.

The salt impact zones reflect the long-term average river impacts of 1,000 megalitre of water traded into each region. Table 1 shows the reported in river impacts.

Table 1: Salinity Impacts of Irrigation                                                                       
Impact Division River Impact (EC) 1,000 ML of Water Traded
Low Impact Zone 1 (LIZ 1) 0.02
Low Impact Zone 1 (LIZ 2) 0.05
Low Impact Zone 1 (LIZ 3) 0.1
Low Impact Zone 1 (LIZ 4) 0.2
High Impact Zone (HIZ) 0.6

SRWA, 2002.. Note: The reported river impacts are long-term averages - 30 years, noting the overall prediction over 100 years (MDBC, 2003).

The creation of five salinity impacts zones means irrigation areas can be identified according to relative impact. Irrigators fall within one zone6 and therefore it is possible to attribute individual salt impact according to water use. A register of individual water allocations is held by the regional water authorities. It is therefore possible to track salt impacts according to water use.

This knowledge allows irrigation impacts to be managed as a point-source impact. The policy toolkit includes policies compatible with point-source impacts. Two such policies are levies or taxes, and tradable permits.

4.2 Salinity levy on water trades

In April 2002 the Victorian Government introduced a new system of salt impact levies in the region. The levies create constraints on the trade of water between irrigators in different impact zones. Irrigators located in the 'High Impact Zone' (HIZ) can only buy water from sellers also located in the HIZ. Irrigators located in the Low Impact Zones 1 to 4 can purchase water from sellers in any impact zone but must pay a salt levy per unit of water traded. The magnitude of this differential levy depends on the impact zones the water is traded between (SRWA 2002). The objective of this policy is to create disincentives for water trade into higher salinity impact zones and thereby encourage new development in zones with a low impact on river salinity.

In order to accommodate new or expanding development in the region, the Victorian Government allocates Salt Disposal Entitlements (SDEs) generated through interception schemes. The zone in which the new or expanding development is to occur determines the number of SDEs required.

Figure 2, shows the main features of the salt impact levy. Figure 2: The Salt Impact Levy.
Figure 2: The Salt Impact Levy

In the current system the government is the sole supplier of additional SDEs. The cost of an additional SDE is estimated to increase rapidly in the next ten years as effective locations for interception run out (MDBC and SRWA, 2003 pers comm.). The Murray Darling Basin Commission estimates the capitalised costs per EC over the next thirty years ranges between 2 million dollars and 4.5 million dollars (MDBC 1999).

The salt levy is an innovative policy mechanism. It has community support and has successfully sent signals to the regional economy that the external impacts of irrigation must be paid for. The salt levy will accommodate a net transfer of water into the region for some years to come. The policy, however, misses a few attributes that are desirable in longer term salinity management.

The levy precludes any sources of salt abatement outside of government. The rising costs of interception will mean alternative options for salt management may need to be found in the future. As locations suitable for new salt interception decline it will be desirable to seek additional suppliers — outside of Government — of salt mitigation. Currently private abatement is precluded.

Tying salinity rights to water rights focuses salt management efforts on water use efficiency. Irrigators will take into account the cost of water plus the salinity levy when deciding to purchase an additional unit of water. They will compare the price of   water plus levy, to the expected return from water. The levy creates an incentive tominimise water use. Water savings can have both a positive and negative impact on river salt concentrations (ABARE 2002). While water savings will lead to less groundwater re-charge, it may also reduce water run-off as excess water is decreased and evapo-transpiration is increased. Reduced run-off may decrease return flows todownstream users and may reduce dilution flows thereby increasing salt concentrations downstream.

Water trade from a higher to a lower salt impact zone creates an external benefit in terms of reduced salt impacts from water use. The Salt Levy, however, does not create incentives for irrigators to trade water into lower impact zones (see Figure 4). The salt levy is a one-sided system. It places a levy on water trades that increase salt concentrations but does not provide a benefit to irrigators if a water trade reduces salt concentrations. The policy may miss opportunities to improve water quality through water trade.

4.3 Tradable Property Rights for Salinity

Tradable property rights for salt are a potential alternative to salt levies on water trade (Gangadharan et. al 2001, provide a comparison between tradable property rights and levies(taxes) for pollution). A tradable right would confer the ability to contribute a defined concentration of salt to the river. The salt property right would be separate to the water property right. This is different to the salt levy, which is tied to the water property right. The salt property right would be defined according to EC impact, and therefore use the same irrigation impact information as the salt levy.

An irrigator would have to hold a salt property right if he wants to use his water property right. For each unit of water used he will have to hold corresponding salt property rights. Irrigators located in higher salt impact zones would need to hold more permits per unit of water than irrigators in lower salt impact zones do. The total number of salt permits in the region would be limited. This limit would be set such that the total concentration contributions from the region do not cause the aggregate contributions from the basin to exceed the Salinity CAP at Morgan. This is different to the salt levy, which does not limit the aggregate contributions from the region: As more water is traded into the region the total salt contributions increase. The government will need to iterate the levy over time to manage the rate of water transfers. In a tradeable permit scheme, new water transfers will need to find salt permits from within the region. This means total salt contributions remain capped overtime and it removes the need for government to adjust salt levies upward in regions with positive net water transfers.

Property rights for salt can more effectively inform irrigators, government and society about the cost of salt in rivers. This is because the salt property right unbundles the salt right from the water right. The water price will reflect the scarcity of water quantity; the salt property right will reflect the scarcity of water quality.

Tradable permits can focus management effort on both water and salt. The water input is an essential factor in production. The user pays for the resource in the water market. Salt is an unavoidable output of the production process. The beneficiary – the user – can pay for using the resource – the river water – in the salt market. Both become essential factors of production and will be considered in all production decisions.

Water and salt concentrations could be traded separately. Irrigators would be able to choose how they pay for their salt impacts on the river. For example,

  • Irrigators could purchase salt property rights to cover their salt impacts.
  • Irrigators could purchase water to dilute their salt impacts
  • Irrigators could undertake approved management changes on their property to mitigate salt accessions to the groundwater.

Government could also be a player in the market. Government could be a supplier of additional salt property rights in the market. The government could supply salt property rights through interception works. Regional water authorities and CMAs could (also) supply additional salt rights. For example, water authorities could undertake infrastructure works which mitigate salt impacts in their region.

Private firms could be players in the market. Private firms that can mitigate salt could also supply additional salt property rights. For example, salt producers in the region currently extract salt from the Murray River, and sell it both domestically and internationally as table and bath salts (often extracting a significant profit from consumers by labelling it as Murray River Salt and advertising the environmental benefits of their product). The private firm receives a private benefit — profit from selling the salt, however they also generate an external benefit by removing salt from the river. Currently we are missing the opportunity to capture this external benefit. Salt property rights could engage these activities. It is possible that private landholders could dedicate areas to specific salt mitigation activities. Landholders can observe the value of salt mitigation from the price of permits in the salt market. The price of a permit reveals the value to users of being able to contribute additional salt to the river. Some landholders may be able to mitigate salt for less than the price of a permit. In this case a landholder may chose to implement approved salt abatement, create a salt permit and sell the permit in the market.

Figure 3 shows the main features of tradable salt property rights.

Figure 3: Tradable salt property rights.
Figure 3: Tradable salt property rights.

5.The Policy Design Economic Experiment

Economic experiments allow government to test and delineate responses to policies in a way that would not be possible in the field, and enable governments to expand their policy toolkit and find innovative methods for dealing with policy questions.

Some examples of experiments that have informed policy design in ways traditional approaches can not include;

  • The US federal SO2 trading program: The auction design selected by the EPA sent strong incentives for traders to strategically manipulate the market. The rules lead to downwardly biased price signals. Cason and Plott, 1996, tested an alternative auction design and observed the strategic incentives to bias price signals were removed and more efficient market outcomes observed.
  • The Los Angeles Regional Clean Air Incentive Market (RECLAIM), a tradable permit program implemented in L.A. to reduce emissions of sulphur and nitrogen oxides: Cason and Gangadharan, 1998, showed that trade transaction costs could be reduced by changing from an electronic bulletin board system, that relied on brokers to match trades, to a computerised double auction.
  • The Victorian Department of Primary Industries BushTender mechanism: The amount of information revealed to landholders bidding in this competitive allocation process influences the cost efficiency of the mechanism. Cson, Gangadharan and Duke, 2003, showed that revealing part of the 'Biodiversity Benfits Index' to participants can minimise the cost to government of procuring management change for biodiversity outcomes.

The experiments replicate field conditions and participants in experiments receive actual financial payments to mimic the pay-offs that parties would face were government to take such action.

The objective is to provide meaningful insight into salinity policy design.

5.1 The Economic Experiment Control - water trade only

In the first instance a water trade only baseline case — called 'the control'— is implemented in the economic laboratory. Participants — often university students, but can also be farmers or government policy development officers — play the role of irrigators. They are allocated across the seven industry sub-sectors, and the subsectors are allocated across the salt impact zones to represent the distribution of landuse in the region. Production characteristics are taken from the field such that subjects have information that reflects irrigation technologies, skill differences, water requirements, costs of production and productivity from the region. Salt impacts are taken from the salinity impact review (SKM 2001) and the salinity zoning system (DNRE 2001).

Participants using their private production information interact in a double auction water market. A double auction is a case where buyers of water can make bids to buy and sellers of water can make offers to sell at anytime the water market is open. Similarly, buyers can accept sellers' offers to sell and sellers can accept buyers' bids to buy at anytime. A double auction market is used in the experiment because the Victorian Mallee water market is a double auction market.

Buyers make bids to buy water by comparing the private return they receive from using water in production and the price (the cost) of water on the water market. A buyer will buy water if he expects his return to be greater than the cost he incurs.

Sellers make offers to sell by comparing the private cost they incur from using less water in production and the price (the return) they receive from selling water. A seller will sell water if the price is greater than her expected costs.

Buyers and sellers participate in the water market through their computers. This is similar to the real water market with growing electronic trade. Buyers make bids to buy on their computer screens and sellers make offers to sell in the same way. Buyers can accept the 'best', that is the lowest, seller's offer to sell and sellers can accept the 'best', that is the highest, buyer's bid to buy. Trades are executed immediately when a bid or offer is accepted in the market. The market is open for nine trading periods.

Nine trading periods have been selected at this stage to represent a nine month irrigation season. Participants must make decisions in the water market. These decisions are made using actual costs and benefits from the field. Participants receive real financial payments dependant on the decisions they make in the market.

Figure 4 shows the main components of the policy design economic experiment.

Figure 4: The experiment components.
Figure 4: The experiment components.

The observations from the control can inform government about the expected price for water in the region in the absence of any salinity policy. The direction of water trade and salt impacts based on the salinity zoning system.


5.2 The Economic Experiment Treatment One - the Salt Levy

Next the salt levy currently operating in the region is implemented as Treatment One in the economic laboratory. The water market is calibrated to the region in the same way as the control (figure 4). This time, however, participants must take account of the salt levy. It is important to note that only buyers pay the salt levy and the magnitude of the levy payable depends on where the buyer and seller to the transaction are located (see section 4.2 for a discussion of the salt levy).

In Treatment One, buyers make bids to buy water by comparing the private return they receive from using water in production and the price (the cost) of water plus any levy they may need to pay. A buyer will buy water if he expects his return to be greater than the price of water plus the tax he incurs. Sellers make offers to sell by comparing the private cost they incur from using less water in production and the price (the return) they receive from selling water. A seller will sell water if the price is greater than her expected costs. The observations from Treatment One can inform government about,

  • the expected price for water in the region when the salt levy is tied to the water,
  • the direction of water trade when participants incur a levy,
  • salt concentration impacts with the levy as compared to the control and,
  • the quantity of levy collected which can then be used for interception works by government.

This information is useful to government, as the salinity levy has only been operating since 2002. It is not therefore possible to conduct robust evaluation of the policy. Observations from experiments can provide insight into expected response to the policy. This could help with future improvements to salinity management in the region and inform other locations about the operation of salinity levies.

5.3 The Economic Experiment Treatment Two - the Salt Market

The salt market is implemented in the economic laboratory as Treatment Two. The water market is calibrated to the region in the same way as in the control and treatment one (see figure 4).

In treatment two, however, participants must hold salt permits if they want to irrigate. In treatment two, buyers make bids to buy water by first comparing the private return they receive from using water in production and the price (the cost) of water. A buyer will buy water if the return from buying water is greater than the cost of water. Buyers must also compare the price they must pay for a salt permit in the salt market. A buyer will therefore choose to buy water if the price of water plus the cost of the salt permit is less than the return to water. Buyers could also invest in salt abatement. Salt abatement is a source of additional salt permits. A buyer will choose to invest in salt abatement if the cost of private abatement is less than the price of a salt permit (Tietenberg, 1985).

Sellers make offers to sell water by comparing the private cost they incur from using less water in production and the price (the return) they receive from selling water. A seller of water can elect to also sell their salt permit to a buyer of water, or they could retain their salt permit. By retaining salt permits irrigators create additional water flows in the river. This is because the supply of salt permits in the market is decreased and this limits the quantity of water that can be used in production. Instead the water remains in the river as environmental flows.

The observations from Treatment Two can inform Government about the expected price for water in the region, the expected price for salt, the expected price for salt abatement — both private and government abatement, and the direction of water trade as compared to the control and treatment one.

6. Conclusion

Policy design economic experiments provide a richer means of predicting behaviour compared to traditional approaches. Experimental economics more explicitly factors in the range of competing interests different groups have, and the sometimes unpredictable nature of human behaviour. Experiments allow government to test policy in ways not feasible in the field.

The salt property right experiment aims to give government and groups involved in achieving the NAP meaningful insights into salinity policy design. The experiments allow policy incentives to be altered under controlled and replicable conditions, so that responses to different policy settings can be observed and the motivations for decisions isolated and understood.

Salinity impacts have both internal and external costs and benefits. Well designed water markets can effectively manage competing interests over water quantities, but alone do not effectively manage water quality. Advances in knowledge about water and salt interactions in irrigation areas has made it possible to attribute salinity impacts to users on a location specific basis.

Advances in economics and information technology mean there are new frameworks available to better understand the major drivers underpinning behaviour by individuals and groups. Salt levies and tradable permits are therefore available from the policy toolkit.

Policy changes, however, are a costly process. Poorly designed policies can create disruptive incentives in the economy and reduce community welfare. The aim of these experiments is to support government deal with policy questions prior to field implementation. It is hoped that this can foster innovations in the way we manage complex interactions between many groups in the economy, effectively engage natural resources in the real economy and decrease policy implementation risk.

Acknowledgements

This Information Note was develop by Charlotte Duke*Economics Branch, Department of Primary Industries Victoria

This paper prepared for the AARES Water Workshop Melbourne, Australia.

The author thanks John Tisdell, Griffith University for kindly allowing me to use the Griffith University, CRC for Catchment Hydrology, Experimental Economics Laboratory. Byron Pakula for extensive data support and robust theoretical analysis.

Victor Lo for software design and support. The members of the MBI pilot 10 working group for field and political process advice. Charles Plott for listening to the ideas and sharing experiences of the ups and downs of the experimental economist.

Notes

Views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department. Use of any results from this paper should clearly attribute the work to the author and not the Department.

* Charlotte Duke, Department of Primary Industries, Victoria, is the project leader (Charlotte.Duke@dpi.vic.gov.au). Members of the project team are Lata Gangadharan, the University of Melbourne; Tim Cason, Purdue University and Byron Pakula, Department of Primary Industries, Victoria.

1 Pilot number 10, The National Market Based Instruments Pilot Program, a joint initiative of all States Territories and the Commonwealth under the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality. (http://www.napswq.gov.au/about/mbi.html)

2 Plott.C, 1994. Experimental testbedding is a situation where a policy is implemented in a laboratory environment. If a policy process does not work in a simple laboratory testbed environment then it is not reasonable to expect it to work if implemented in a complex field setting. The laboratory exercise can be formulated as a proof of principle. If a policy operates acceptably in a testbed environment it must do so for theoretically understandable reasons: The policy must pass a test of design consistency in which it is demonstrated that the behaviour of the process is consistent with the behavioural principles upon which it is built.

3 Cason.T and Plott.C, 1996.

4 Cason.T. and Gangadharan.L., 1998.

5 Cason.T, Gangadharan.G. and Duke.C., 2003.

6 SRWA, 2002.

References

  • Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2002, Improving water use efficiency, ABARE Current Issues, July 2002.
  • Cason.T and Plott.C, EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30, pp.133-160.
  • Cason.T. and Gangadharan.L., 2001, An Experimental Study of Electronic Bulletin Board Trading for Emission Permits, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 12, pp.55-73.
  • Cson.T, Gangadharan.G. and Duke.C, 2003, A laboratory study of Auctions for reducing Non-point source Pollution, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46, pp.446-471.
  • Department of Natural Resources and Environment, 2001, The Value of Water, a guide to water trading in Victoria, DNRE December 2001.
  • Gangadharan.L. and Duke.C., 2001, Tradable Permit Markets for Pollution Control, Department of Natural Resources and Environment Economics Branch Working Paper August 2001.
  • Murray Darling Basin Commission, 1999, Historical Costs from MDBC Salinity Drainage Strategy - ten years on, provided by the MDBC July 2003.
  • Murray Darling Basin Commission, 2003, Basin Salinity Management Strategy Operational Protocols, MDBC May 2003.
  • Plott.C, 1994, Market Architectures, Institutional Landscapes and Testbed Experiments, Economic Theory, 4(1), pp.3-10.
  • Sinclair Knight Merz Pty Ltd, 2001, Mallee Region Salt Impacts of Water Trade, a report prepared for the Department of Natural Resources, SKM November 2001.
  • Sunraysia Rural Water Authority, 2002, Refinement of the River Salinity Zoning System, SRWA April 2002.
  • Sunraysia Rural Water Authority, 2002, Refinement of the River Salinity Zoning System.
  • SunRise21 Mapping and Information Services, May 2003.
  • Tietenberg.T., 1985, Emissions Trading an exercise in reforming pollution policy, Resources for the Future, Washington D.C.